Local Health Department Choice in the Provision of Cancer and Cardiovascular Disease Screening by Tiu, Georgianne
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Public Health (M.P.H. 
& Dr.P.H.) College of Public Health 
2016 
Local Health Department Choice in the Provision of Cancer and 
Cardiovascular Disease Screening 
Georgianne Tiu 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cph_etds 
 Part of the Public Health Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Tiu, Georgianne, "Local Health Department Choice in the Provision of Cancer and Cardiovascular Disease 
Screening" (2016). Theses and Dissertations--Public Health (M.P.H. & Dr.P.H.). 116. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cph_etds/116 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Public Health at UKnowledge. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Public Health (M.P.H. & Dr.P.H.) by an authorized 
administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my capstone and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been 
given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed 
copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) from the 
owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic 
distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be submitted to 
UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s capstone including 
all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the 
statements above. 
Georgianne Tiu, Student 
Glen Mays, PhD, MPH, Committee Chair 
Wayne Sanderson, PhD, MS, Director of Graduate Studies 
  
 
ABSTRACT OF CAPSTONE 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgianne F. Tiu 
 
 
 
 
 
The College of Public Health 
University of Kentucky 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT CHOICE IN THE PROVISION OF 
CANCER AND CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE SCREENING 
  
ABSTRACT OF CAPSTONE 
 
A Capstone project submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Public Health in the 
College of Public Health 
at the University of Kentucky 
By: 
 
 
Georgianne F. Tiu 
 
 
Lexington, Kentucky  
Director: (Glen P. Mays, MPH, PhD) 
Lexington, Kentucky 
Co-Directors: (F. Douglas Scutchfield, MD, Julia F. 
Costich, PhD, JD, & Tyrone F. Borders, PhD, MS, MA) 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Copyright © Georgianne F. Tiu 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT OF CAPSTONE 
 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT CHOICE IN THE PROVISION OF 
CANCER AND CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE SCREENING 
 
Clinical preventive services, such as cancer and cardiovascular (CVD) disease screenings 
are critical components essential for reaching optimal population health outcomes. Although 
clinical preventive services are recognized to save lives, roughly three-fourths of adults between 
the ages of 50 and 64 and over 50% of adults aged 65 years and older forego clinical preventive 
services. Private medical practitioners can provide such services. However, public sector entities, 
such as local health departments (LHDs), can also deliver them in addition to population based 
activities. Because of a possible substitution effect among health systems, we hypothesized that a 
LHD’s choice to be involved with providing cancer or CVD screenings, is contingent on the 
availability and capacity of other providers in the community. We merged the 2013 NACCHO 
Profile Survey with the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) and used maximum likelihood 
estimation. Results revealed a LHD’s choice to be involved in performing CVD screening directly 
in a LHD is statistically associated with the availability and supply of private providers in the 
community, whereas involvement with cancer screening did not reach statistical significance. 
Other key organizational and sociodemographic variables were strongly associated. The interplay 
between health systems and its impact on population health outcomes further illustrates the need 
to support public health practice and policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The delivery of clinical preventive services has gained political spotlight in the past 
years. Private practices and clinics have been the traditional health system to deliver clinical 
care, but they are not the sole community providers.  Other health systems such as local 
health departments (LHD) are unique in that they can provide both personal healthcare 
services such as clinical preventive, medical treatment, and specialty care services and 
implement activities for improving population health. Often, uninsured residents seek out 
clinical preventive services from LHDs and other entities such as community health centers 
that contribute to the “safety-net” to fill unmet health care needs. As part of the assurance 
function of public health, LHDs can implement personal healthcare services directly or by 
linking patients to other health care providers in the community by contracting out services. 
LHDs can also choose to be uninvolved in the provision of personal healthcare services, 
letting the community rely on the other healthcare providers to deliver care. Despite the 
assurance function, however, who should “assure conditions in which people can be healthy” 
is subject to debate, and disagreement on what role public health should play in directly 
providing personal healthcare services is on-going.  
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined public health as "[a] coordinated effort at 
the local, state, and federal levels whose mission is fulfilling society's interest in assuring 
conditions in which people can be healthy."1 Some LHD directors believe that offering 
clinical  services is a part of the overall mission of public health.2,3 Others follow the IOM 
recommendations on the future of public health, which advise LHDs to shy away from 
offering clinical services and focus on the core public health functions of assessment, 
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assurance, and policy development.4,5 In the early 2000s, Keane et al. conducted a series of 
studies on LHD directors’ personal beliefs concerning privatizing public health services, not 
offering clinical services, and discontinuing direct provision of these services.2,3,6–10 More 
recent research by Hsuan and Rodriguez found that 198 large LHDs discontinued 
approximately 5.6 clinical services per LHD from 1997 to 2008; however, more than 20% 
of LHDs adopted new services.11 These findings suggest that despite declining trends in 
direct provision of clinical preventive services, some LHDs still realize the value of offering 
them directly.  
Other recent research suggests trends within the wide variation in the provision of 
personal healthcare delivery and its dependence on organizational, institutional, or 
environmental factors. Luo et al revealed a positive association between clinical preventive 
health services’ share of revenue and per capita expenditures.12 Recent research conducted 
by Wright and Nice provides evidence that variation in the provision of primary care services 
in LHDs is a function of health center availability in the county.13 Furthermore, Beatty and 
colleagues identified major differences  in direct clinical service provision in small and large 
rural LHDs as well as urban LHDs.14  
Statement of the Problem 
 
Despite the evidence base on privatization and discontinuation of clinical preventive 
health services, not much is known about the drivers behind an LHD’s decision to be 
involved with clinical preventive healthcare services such as cancer and cardiovascular 
disease screening. Understanding more about these decisions is important, as LHDs 
exhibited higher levels of involvement in disease screening compared to the delivery of 
primary care services in 2013.13 In a 2013 survey, approximately 83% of LHDs  screened 
for breast cancer, 88% screened for cervical cancer, and about 41%  screened for colon 
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cancer.15 Some LHDs (19%) provide prostate cancer screening activities as a component of 
primary prevention.16 For cardiovascular disease, 27% of all LHDs surveyed provided 
preventive screening services in 2013.15 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), Medicaid expansion, and  rising rates of insured 
individuals have increased the demand for health care services and has simultaneously 
created challenges for health care providers.17 Safety-net providers such as LHDs and 
community health centers that offer clinical preventive health services will continue to play 
an important role in filling unmet needs.17  This is especially important since, as Ku et al 
discovered, most safety-net patients do not see these systems as a last resort; instead, they 
actually prefer the types of care they receive there.17 In addition, since the implementation 
of the ACA, the demand for primary care services has outpaced the supply.18  In many remote 
regions of the United States, clinical preventive health services are simply not available. 
Healthcare providers are either absent, unaffordable, or not accessible because of special 
health care needs, insurance status or type, distance, or cultural barriers.18 Residents of these 
communities depend on neighboring LHDs or community health centers for their healthcare 
needs.  
Purpose of the Study 
Through early detection, chronic disease screening activities could have appreciable 
implications on population health indicators as well as healthcare expenditures. On the 
contrary, however, LHDs could also explore the possibility on focusing more on traditional 
public health activities, since more people are increasingly obtaining health insurance 
through the Medicaid expansions and state and federal health exchanges.19 These newly 
insured individuals may seek other providers besides the LHD for healthcare needs. 
Moreover, some believe that the decision to provide primary care services is contingent on 
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the availability and capacity of other safety-net providers in the area, such as FQHCs.13 
Because of a possible substitution effect, we hypothesize that a LHD’s choice to provide 
clinical preventive services such as cancer and cardiovascular disease screening are 
dependent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community.  
Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework for our study draws from economic, organizational, and 
management theories. Organizational theories of human service organizations20 (i.e., 
political-economy and institutional theories) are used to explain how the environment can 
influence organizational structure, and hence decision making in the provision of service 
delivery. The economic random utility theory provides a framework for LHD delivery 
choice.   
Organizational theories emerged more than 50 years ago in the public administration 
literature. Some organizational theories are more applicable to human service organizations 
than others because of the distinct characteristic that separates human services from others 
— human services work on people to transform them.20 This attribute contributes to the 
complexity of the nature of human service organizations. Thus, work from the 1970s by 
Wamsley & Zald21 on political economy and Meyer & Rowan22 on institutional theory 
provide salient frameworks for human service organizations,20 including public health 
services and systems.11,23–27 
The political-economy theory has several notable attributes that can be applied to 
public health systems.  First, it acknowledges that two fundamental types of resources must 
be obtained by an organization in order to survive and yield services: (1) legitimacy and 
power (i.e., political) and (2) production resources (i.e., economic).21 Wamsley & Zald 
proposed that “just as nation-states vary in their political economies — their structure of rule 
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authority, succession to high office, power and authority distribution, division of labor, 
incentive systems and modes of allocation of resources — so, too, do organizations.”21 
Second, this theory stresses the importance of environments, especially the task 
environment, composed of stakeholders that can be governmental or non-governmental 
organizations or interest groups who are relevant because they have control of resources 
needed by the organization or they have a stake so they can advance their own agendas. 
Third, a key feature is the idea of resource dependence.28 Pfeffer and Salancik suggest that 
as the dependence on resources controlled by an external entity increases, so does the 
influence of that entity on the organization. Fourth, since an organization needs to possess 
stability in the flow of external resources while simultaneously preserving independence and 
autonomy, it can participate in strategies that range from competition to co-optation to 
survive among members of the external environment.29 Fifth, within the organization, power 
and economic relations regulate how service technology is applied and how decision-making 
units are disseminated among the organizational divisions. However, important attributes of 
the institution are lacking with the political-economy theory. Therefore, institutional theory 
offers constructs that alleviates this limitation.  
Institutional theory emphasizes societal and organizational values and norms, and 
contends that the structure of certain types of organizations, namely human service 
organizations, is determined not by technology but by rules originating from the institutional 
environment.20 Public opinion from important constituencies, knowledge legitimated by the 
educational system, by social prestige, by laws, and by the courts22 are examples of rules 
from the institutionalized environment.  
In addition to political-economy and institutional theories, economic theories such as 
the random utility theory provides a framework for rational decision making and discrete 
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choices. Discrete choice random utility theory has three main assumptions: (1) choice is a 
discrete event (0,1); (2) attraction or utility towards a service provision choice varies across 
individual LHDs as a random variable; (3) the LHD chooses the service provision choice 
with the highest utility. When a LHD chooses an option that produces the highest utility, it 
can be best described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” provided by a product or service. 
It is important to note, however, that utility and predicting choices cannot be measured 
exactly since choices vary (and are random) across individuals LHDs. A LHD in our study 
can choose between three discrete choices: (1) the choice to remain uninvolved and allow 
others in the community independent of LHD funding provide the service; (2) contract out 
the service; or (3) perform the service directly.  
Organizational, Institutional, and Environmental characteristics 
 
Drawing upon the attributes of political-economy and institutional theories, previous 
empirical studies indicate that organizational, financial, and institutional characteristics 
influence the public health system.11,23–26 These organizational and institutional attributes 
likely influence service delivery arrangements among LHDs.  
LHD workforce and staff may influence service delivery of personal health care 
services. The presence of a clinician executive director (MD or DO) may play a role in the 
decision to provide primary care services that include the clinical preventive services of 
disease screening. By contrast, the presence of an executive director with a public health 
education (MPH or DrPH) may also play a role.13 
Funding affects the amount and types of resources consumed, workforce personnel 
employed, and public health activities offered.23 It is not surprising that LHDs that face 
financial constraints are more likely to share resources.26 Local tax bases and other sources 
of revenue are used to fund public health services and activities.30 Economically 
13  
disadvantaged communities may have limited tax bases and face competition for resources 
which can create difficulties in supporting the full array of public health activities.31,32  
 Political dynamics can influence an organization.26 Recent evidence revealed that 
political dynamics such as the presence or absence of a local board of health  influences 
public health spending,24,33–35 performance,23  adoption and discontinuation of clinical 
services among LHDs,11 and local health department collaborative capacity.25 Therefore, 
investigating the effect of a local board of health is included in our study. 
  Local governmental public health agencies can function as centralized 
administrative units of a state health agency or as decentralized, autonomous units of local 
government.27 Districts and jurisdictions with a decentralized political structure have the 
ability to differentiate themselves by providing specific arrangements of public services and 
taxing structures.36 Decentralized political structures tend to be more informed and 
responsive to local community needs27,33,37–40 and consequently increases societal well-
being.36,40 Previous evidence illustrates that state-governed LHDs share resources most 
extensively, as well as LHDs that cover multiple jurisdictions, and states with centralized 
governance.26 
Externalities and inequities are main concerns with decentralized units. Giving local 
governments the power to provide services to their communities without funding support 
from higher levels of government can make inequality worse if citizens self-select into 
jurisdictions that are based on their capacity to pay for services.36 In other words, residents 
with lower incomes may be forced to gravitate toward areas that have lower tax bases, 
creating an unchanging cycle of decreased ability for local governments to pay for health 
services offered by governmental agencies, such as LHDs. Centralizing the governmental 
structures or coordinating decision-making across governments would internalize these 
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externalities by addressing spillover effects and correcting inequities.36,40  
Governmental jurisdiction type (i.e., county versus multi-county) can also influence 
the extent of shared organizational functions. According to Vest & Shah, shared 
organizational functions were higher among LHDs with county and multicounty/district 
jurisdictions compared to cities.26  
Population characteristics that reflect the health needs and resources of a community 
and the social and economic determinants influence an organization. Employment and 
income, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, age, language and culture influence many 
aspects of the public health system.41–48 In addition, geographic location could also be a 
factor. Jurisdictions located in small or rural areas with smaller populations may spend more 
on certain public health activities, which may lead some public health agencies to consider 
sharing resources through mergers and consolidations, regional alliances, or joint operating 
agreements23 or privatizing and contracting out services to other health systems.    
Operational Definitions  
A local health department is defined as, “an administrative or service unit of local or 
state government concerned with health and carrying some responsibility for the health of a 
jurisdiction smaller than the state.”49  
LHDs exhibit large variations in personal healthcare services. Out of 87 public health 
services surveyed in the NACCHO Profile studies, 22 services are considered personal 
healthcare services.12 Luo et al collectively classified these 22 services, and adapted them 
from Mays and Smith.24  Personal healthcare services are categorized as clinical preventive 
services, medical treatment services, and specialty care services.12 We focused on the clinical 
preventive services of cancer and cardiovascular disease screening 
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Performed directly by the LHD 
Some public health systems feel the pressure to assure access to medical care 
services, especially in smaller and rural areas that face challenges with healthcare 
professional shortages with large populations of low-income, uninsured, and underinsured 
residents. This  is because many LHD leaders still believe that offering these services is an 
intrinsic part of the mission of public health The LHD helps to fill the gaps in the “safety 
net.”3 Moreover, personal health care services can produce a significant proportion of 
revenue from self-generated fee-for-service dollars that is used to perform core public health 
functions.50 In a recent study conducted by Hsuan and Rodriguez, using panel data from 
1997 and 208, 22.2% of LHDs surveyed maintained or adopted the provision of clinical 
services.11 Adopter LHDs tended to offer personal healthcare services that generated 
revenue.11 In a study conducted by Keane et al in 2001, 28% of LHD directors surveyed self-
reported that LHDs were the primary provider of services to uninsured residents in their 
jurisdictions.3  
Contracted Out by LHD  
Besides performing personal healthcare services directly, LHDs may choose to 
contract out or privatize these services. Previous work by Keane et al conducted in the early 
2000s provided insight to the beliefs as to why LHD directors blieved they should contract 
out or privatize personal healthcare services and discontinue direct offerings.3,8,10,50–52 
Surveys were sent to 380 LHD directors, and they obtained a completion rate of 75%. In one 
study, when asked to hypothetically assume that no one was uninsured, 53% of LHD 
directors believed that a LHD should provide personal healthcare services directly.3 Keane 
et al also discovered that 73% of LHD directors surveyed privatized at least some public 
health service.52 In another study by Keane et al on the same sample of directors, more than 
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half the directors believed that privatizing services had a positive effect on their department’s 
performance of the core public health functions.50 Privatizing personal healthcare services 
was the most common with 70 percent of LHDs contracting out to other healthcare providers 
in the community.50 This included maternal and child health (20%), pediatric primary care 
(19%), and family planning (12 %). Some communicable disease services were privatized 
in almost a third (27%) of LHDs, with 13% percent privatizing HIV services, 9 % for STD 
services other than HIV, and tuberculosis services (9%). All of these services are considered 
to be personal healthcare services. Despite the positive effects of privatizing personal 
healthcare services, privatization can also lead to the loss of revenue and result in less 
funding to perform essential core public health activities necessary for improving population 
health.12,50 In a recent study on personal healthcare services in LHDs to date conducted by 
Luo et al,12 fixed effect panel models revealed a positive association between personal 
healthcare services’ share of revenue and per capita expenditures from 2008-2013. LHDs 
with jurisdiction sizes of <25,000 people highly depend on personal healthcare services to 
maintain per capita expenditures.12  
Contracting out services can be considered a form of cross-jurisdictional sharing. In 
2013, around 50% of LHDs that served populations less than 500,000 and 35% of LHDs that 
served more than 500,000 people shared resources such as equipment, staff, or funding with 
one or more LHDs on a regular basis.15 Empirical evidence suggests that CJS can improve 
both efficiency (i.e., achieving maximum results for every dollar that is invested) and 
effectiveness (i.e., the scope and quality of services offered) of public health services.53 This 
is because a greater volume of public health services would be delivered and fixed costs 
would be distributed over a larger population of taxpayers and beneficiaries, lowering per 
unit costs.23,36 Public health agencies that serve larger jurisdictions can achieve economies 
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of scale when performing public health activities that require high fixed costs, such as 
surveillance systems.23 The sharing spectrum ranges from informal and customary 
agreements with looser integration to complete consolidation of LHD agencies with tighter 
integration.53,54  
Provided by Others in the Community Independent of LHD Funding  
Besides the LHD, private medical practices, clinics, and FQHCs can provide cancer 
and cardiovascular disease screening. To date, there are 126,865 Family Medicine/General 
Practice physicians,55 and as of 2013, there were 1,202 federally qualified health centers.56 
Depending on the geographic location and need of the community, community and migrant 
health centers (C/MHC), rural health clinics (RHC), and federally qualified health centers 
(FQHC) can act as safety-nets and fill unmet healthcare needs. FQHCs served more than 20 
million patients and operated more than 8,100 health care delivery sites in every state and 
US territory in 2010.57 Furthermore, health centers provide a fourth of all primary care visits 
for low-income individuals.58   
Overview of Project Processes 
Investigating if a LHD’s choice to be involved with the delivery of clinical preventive 
services is contingent on the supply and availability of other healthcare providers in the 
community who are independent of LHD funding, is the purpose of this dissertation. 
Combining the 2013 National Association for County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) 
Profile Data with the NACCHO Boundary Files and Area Health Resource Files 
(AHRF)(2013-2014, 2014-2015), we conducted secondary data analysis with discrete choice 
binary, multinomial, and sequential logit models using maximum likelihood estimation. We 
focused on the specific clinical preventive services of cancer screening and cardiovascular 
disease screening activities. Chapter 1 contains the overall purpose and significance, with a 
18  
general overview containing literature review and theory/conceptual framework as well as 
operational definitions. Chapter 2 discusses the data sources and methodology used for 
maximum likelihood estimation. Chapter 3 focuses on the cancer screening, and Chapter 4 
focuses on the cardiovascular disease screening. Lastly, Chapter 5 contains overall 
conclusions and discusses major implications for both public health and medical care 
delivery systems. 
Scope and Importance of Study  
 In summary, the provision of clinical preventive services by LHDs is of timely health 
policy importance, as many Americans struggle with chronic diseases, such as cancer and 
cardiovascular disease. In 2012, the Institute of Medicine published a report entitled, 
Primary Care and Public Health: Exploring Integration to Improve Population Health, and 
prompted new attention to the need for integration and collaboration among health systems 
in order to achieve optimal population health outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to re-examine 
the level of involvement with offering healthcare services among LHDs12 and gain further 
insight to the factors that influence a LHD’s choice to be involved with disease screening 
activities. 
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CHAPTER 2   
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter presents an overview of the data sources, underlying utility theory, and 
statistical methods used in Chapters 3 and 4. Data sources and description are described first. 
Steps for merging the datasets are described next. Dependent and independent variables are 
then discussed. Lastly, statistical analysis and specification tests are presented in detail.  
Data Sources and Description 
We used three different data sources for our studies. The study sample included 
LHDs that participated in the 2013 National Association of County and City Health Officials 
(NACCHO) Profile of Local Health Departments (Profile Survey).15 NACCHO conducted 
the survey from January to March 2013. Rhode Island and Hawaii were not included in the 
NACCHO Profile Survey because these states do not operate LHDs. The Profile survey 
instrument encompassed a core questionnaire along with two separate modules. The core 
questionnaire was disseminated to all local health departments in the United States. Each 
module was disseminated to a random sample stratified by population served without 
replacement.  A total of 2,000 out of 2,532 LHDs completed the survey, making the overall 
response rate 79%.15 For this study, we analyzed data from survey questions from the Core 
questionnaire, (Activities section) focusing on the cancer and cardiovascular disease 
screening activities.  
The NACCHO Boundary Files were the second data set used for our studies.  It 
contains five digit Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) county codes. This code 
is a unique identifier for counties and county equivalents. For example, the FIPS county code 
for Fayette County, Kentucky is 21067. 
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The third data source was the Area Health Resource File (AHRF). The AHRF 
contains a vast amount of data on health care supply factors such as information on 
healthcare professionals, health facilities, utilization, expenditures, environment, and 
workforce, for instance. The AHRF contains FIPS county codes that were used to link LHDs 
to the NACCHO Profile Survey. To obtain 2013 variables, we pulled data from the 2013-
2014 AHRF and the 2014-2015 AHRF.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each activity in the charts below and on the following pages, check whether and how 
your LHD provided that activity or service in your jurisdiction during the past year. 
 
 Indicate whether your LHD performed the activity and/or contracted out for it.  Select 
both boxes if your LHD both performed the activity directly and contracted out for it.  
 Contract out is defined as "Pay another organization to perform this activity or service 
on behalf of your LHD". 
 “Provided by others in community independent of LHD funding” means that other 
organizations provide these services and do not receive funding from the LHD to 
provide them. Other organizations include but are not limited to other state and local 
government agencies, other healthcare providers (e.g., private physicians, non-LHD 
clinics, hospitals), schools, and community organizations. 
 If a service is provided by the LHD and others in the community, select both choices. 
 Do not leave any rows blank  
Figure 2.1. Excerpt from the NACCHO Profile Survey. This illustrates the instructions for the survey 
respondent and is taken directly from the “Activities” section.  
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We obtained the NACCHO Profile Survey upon approval of an application from the 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The NACCHO 
Boundary files were obtained from the NACCHO website. Likewise, the last dataset used 
for our study, the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF), were obtained from their website as 
well. 
After obtaining all datasets, we merged them. Figure 1 illustrates the flow chart for 
the steps taken to merge the datasets. We first merged the NACCHO Profile Survey dataset 
with the NACCHO Boundary Files using the common variable, “nacchoid.” Each LHD is 
designated a unique nacchoid. LHDs classified as, “city,” “multi-city,” and “city-county” 
Figure 2.2. Flow Chart of Merging Datasets. This figure outlines the steps used for creating the 
master dataset for the statistical analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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were dropped from the merged NACCHO dataset. Next we separated this dataset into 
“county only” and “multi-county only.” For each separate dataset, we merged them with the 
AHRF, using the “FIPS county code” as the merging variable. Since the AHRF contains 
more FIPS county codes than NACCHO, several FIPS county codes without a matching 
LHD were deleted. Next, we merged the county and multi-county LHDs together. Because 
multi-county LHDs are comprised of several counties (with multiple FIPS county codes), 
independent variables for the multi-county LHDs were summated if the variable was a count 
or created into population weighted averages. Multi-county variables were then collapsed, 
with one nacchoid per LHD. The final study sample consisted of 1,645 matched LHDs. 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
 Because we hypothesized that choosing to be involved with the delivery of clinical 
preventive services (i.e., by contracting out or performing the service directly) is dependent 
on the availability and supply of other healthcare professionals and systems in the 
community, our dependent variable is a discrete choice (0,1). The first model we constructed 
was a simple binary logit, in which whether or not a LHD was involved in delivering a 
screening service. The choices of performing service directly or contracting out was 
aggregated into the singular choice, “involved.” It is important to note that the survey 
respondent  from the NACCHO Profile was allowed to select more than one answer choice. 
For discrete choice models, however, it is crucial that only one observation select one choice. 
Therefore, we coded the variable to reflect only one answer choice, always keeping in mind 
the most logical choice. For instance, if a LHD selected that it implemented cancer screening 
directly and others in the community provide it, then the dependent variable was coded as 
performed cancer screening directly.  
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Subsequently, we expanded the choice set in the multinomial model, since a LHD 
could choose between three options: (1) stay uninvolved and let others in the community 
provide the service (base); (2) contract out; or (3) directly perform the service. We used a 
multinomial logit model to discern if the three choices (as opposed to only two in the binary 
logit model) are dependent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the 
community, while controlling for other covariates. 
 
The binary and multinomial logit estimations use random utility discrete choice models. In 
economics, utility can be described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” provided by a 
product or service. In addition, choice behavior is contingent upon the assumption that 
individuals make rational choices. Despite this assumption, however, utility and predicting 
choices cannot be measured exactly. Therefore, in random utility models,  
𝑢𝑖𝑗 =  𝑣𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗  
utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑗, given to individual i by choice j is made up of a deterministic component, 𝑣𝑖𝑗, 
and an unobserved stochastic error component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 . Therefore, a designated leader in a LHD 
makes a rational choice, choosing the option that has the highest utility. Identifying if the 
Figure 2.3 Conceptual Framework for the Discrete Choice Models. A LHD is first faced with the choice to become involved 
with the delivery of a personal healthcare service such as cancer or cardiovascular disease screening. By contrast, a LHD could also 
choose to be uninvolved in the screening activities, letting others (i.e., private practices, hospitals, FQHCs) independent of LHD 
funding provide the service to the community.  If the LHD does choose to be involved, then it has two options: (1) directly perform 
the service or (2) contract out the service to other healthcare professionals in the community.  
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decision to be involved in disease screening is dependent on the availability of other 
providers in the community is the primary research interest. Furthermore, investigating if a 
LHD’s decisions are sequential on a previous decision is also of interest, for reasons 
explained later. The sequential logit models are not random discrete utility models, for they 
are conventional binary logistic estimations done in sequence.   
Independent variables  
Because we hypothesized that choosing to be involved with the delivery of personal 
healthcare services (i.e., by contracting out or performing the service directly), such as cancer 
and cardiovascular disease screening activities, are dependent on the availability and supply 
of healthcare providers in the community, our main independent variables of interest are 
primary care physicians and midlevels (i.e., physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and 
advanced practice nurses), who are the other healthcare providers independent of LHD 
funding. We also controlled for institutional, financial, and community variables consistent 
with previous public health services and systems research and organizational and 
institutional theories.23,26  
In terms of other healthcare supply factors, we controlled for the presence of a 
federally qualified health center (FQHC) and total hospital beds per 10,000 population.  
For demographic factors, we controlled for the percentages of non-white race, 
Hispanic ethnicity, in poverty, and uninsured.  
LHD staffing and leadership variables were LHD staff per 10,000 population, 
percentage of LHDs with a clinician (MD, DO) executive director, and percentage of LHDs 
with a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director. 
Variables for LHD governance characteristics included the presence of a local board 
of health (LBOH) to measure LHD autonomy. To measure the state-local administrative 
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relationship, we categorized the variable into shared (omitted), local, or state governance.  
For geographic location, we created three dummy variables of rural (omitted), urban 
(nonmetro), and metro, using the classification system established by the 2013 Rural Urban 
Commuting Area codes. RUCA categories 1–3 were coded as metro, categories 4–7 were 
coded as urban (nonmetro), and categories 8-9 were coded as rural.59  
For LHD jurisdiction type, we included only county (omitted) or multi-county 
variables.  
Lastly, for LHD jurisdiction population size served, we categorized this variables 
into 5 categories: population size served <25,000; 25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999, 100,00 – 
499,999 and >500,000.  
There are several ways to define urban, suburban, and rural geographic regions of the 
US.60 According to NACCHO, a LHD is defined as “an administrative or service unit of 
local or state government concerned with health, and carrying some responsibility for the 
health of a jurisdiction smaller than the state.”61 In the 2005 NACCHO Profile, NACCHO 
classified urban, suburban, and rural LHDs based on Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) 
2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 
Metro counties 
1  Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more 
2  Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population 
3  Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population 
Nonmetro counties 
4  Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 
5  Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 
6  Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area 
7  Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 
Completely rural 
8  Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area 
9  Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area 
 
Figure 2.4 2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes. Contains the code description of the 
geographic categories.  
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codes developed by the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture. 
The codes classify census tracts using population density, daily commuting, and 
urbanization.59,60,62 The 2013 NACCHO Profile did not classify LHDs using the RUCA 
codes.  However, RUCA codes are contained in the AHRF. Therefore, we determined which 
geographic regions the LHDs belonged to by matching FIPS county codes from the AHRF. 
We used the most recent RUCA codes from 2013.59 Using census tract demographic and 
work commuting data, RUCA created 9 major categories. A RUCA code of 1.0, for instance, 
signifies a metro county in which residents commute mostly within the area. RUCA 
categories 1-3 were coded “metro,” categories 4–7 were coded “urban (nonmetro),” and 
categories 8-9 were coded “rural.”  
Statistical Analysis 
Our research questions of interest are, “Is the decision to be involved with delivering 
cancer or cardiovascular disease screening dependent on the availability or supply of other 
healthcare professionals (health systems) in the community?” and “What factors lead 
communities to lean on public versus private providers?” 
After we successfully merged the datasets, we conducted specification tests. 
Descriptive statistics were then generated to examine the distribution of responses. Sample 
summary statistics are presented in Table 1 in Chapters 3 (cancer screening) and 4 
(cardiovascular disease screening).  
Specification tests to finding the preferred model 
To account for the possibility of interactions, we created a model without interaction 
terms (parsimonious) as well as a model with interaction terms. We conducted specification 
tests to determine which the preferred model. To test for multi-collinearity, we employed 
pairwise correlation tests for multicollinearity using the “correlate” command and the 
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“collin” command. The variance inflation factor (VIFs) illustrated that all covariates were 
acceptable for estimation. All covariates were between values of approximately 1.12-2.53, 
signifying only mild correlation. Tolerance for all covariates were above 0.4 (As a rule of 
thumb, a tolerance of 0.1 or less (equivalent to VIF of 10 or greater) is a cause for concern.) 
It is important to note that some degree of collinearity is to be expected. Three covariates 
had very mild collinearity and were the percent of people in poverty (VIF = 2.17), metro 
location (VIF = 2.27) and jurisdiction population size (VIF = 2.53). Because of previously 
published work and theory, we decided to keep the covariates in the model. Furthermore, 
newer versions of Stata detect the presence of perfect collinearity and will drop variables 
that are too collinear after estimation is executed. No covariates were dropped from our 
models.   
Both the parsimonious model and model with interaction terms were analyzed with 
binary logit estimation. Binary logit estimation was used because of the discrete choice 
dependent variable, and estimates are obtained through the use of maximum likelihood 
estimation. For a study sample with N independent observations, the maximum likelihood 
estimator (MLE), ?̂?, maximizes the associated log-likelihood function 
ln 𝐿(𝛽) = ∑ [𝑦𝑖 ln 𝐹(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) ln{1 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)}]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Accordingly, the MLE is produced by iterative methods. Furthermore, it is asymptotically 
normally distributed. For each screening service, we conducted a binary logit estimation and 
obtained beta values and average marginal effects (AME). The marginal effects are the 
outcomes of interest because in non-linear models, they are more informative than beta 
values.63 The standard errors for the marginal effects were obtained using the delta method, 
in which Stata generated the output.  
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 Furthermore, we used log likelihood ratio tests (LR test) to determine the preferred 
model. Log likelihood ratios are provided in the output post-estimation. A manual LR test 
revealed that the parsimonious model (without the interaction terms) was indeed the 
preferred model. The p-value for the chi square statistic was determined to be insignificant 
after computation in Excel using the “CHI.DIST” function. The insignificant p-value 
suggested that the model with interaction terms is not better than the parsimonious model. 
Therefore, we chose to perform estimations with the parsimonious model.   
Specification test between binomial and multinomial logit models 
After estimation with the binary logit models, we also executed multinomial logit 
estimation and obtained the maximum likelihood estimates of betas with standard errors and 
average marginal effects (AME) predicted at each outcome (except the base of “not 
involved”) with standard errors. For multinomial models, the maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE), 𝜃, maximizes the log-likelihood function: 
ln 𝐿(𝜃) = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ln 𝐹𝑗(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
It is important to note that the signs of the beta values may not have the same sign as the 
MEs. We therefore conducted another manual LR test to determine if the binary or 
multinomial model was the preferred model. The results revealed that the chi square statistic 
was significant (p<.001), illustrating that the multinomial model is preferred over the binary 
logit model.  
Specification tests between multinomial and sequential logit models 
After the completion of the multinomial estimations, we used the Hausman test to 
determine if the multinomial model violated the independence of irrelevant alternative 
assumption (IIA). The IIA is a part of the discrete choice theory and assumes that the relative 
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odds of selecting between two or more choices are independent of other choices being 
considered at the same time. For example, based on this assumption, a voter would have the 
same odds of choosing between Trump and Clinton compared to choosing between Trump, 
Clinton, and a third candidate running for Presidency. In essence, the IIA assumption is based 
on the premise that when individuals have the opportunity to choose among a set of 
alternatives, the odds of choosing A over B should not depend if another alternative, C, were 
introduced as a choice.  
The Hausman-McFadden64 and the Small-Hsiao65 test are the two most notable tests 
for the IIA in multinomial models. Therefore, we conducted the Hausman test to determine 
if our multinomial models adhered or violated the IIA assumption. After performing the 
Hausman test on both the cancer and cardiovascular disease screening multinomial models, 
the chi square statistic was not significant and negative, meaning the multinomial models 
violated the IIA assumption. The results of this test suggest that the choices are nested within 
one another. It is important to note two important attributes of the tests: (1) this assumption 
is more applicable to conditional, nested logit models and (2)  more recent work conducted 
by Fry and Harris66,67 and Cheng and Long68, illustrate that both the Hausman-McFadden 
and Small-Hsiao test perform poorly, despite large sample sizes. Cheng and Long even 
concluded that, “tests of the IIA assumption that are based on the estimation of a restricted 
choice set are unsatisfactory for applied work.” 68  
Because the multinomial models failed the Hausman test (see Appendix I), we 
constructed a sequential logit model, also known as hierarchical logit (see Appendix I). The 
sequential logit estimation was used because of the nature of our research questions and the 
lack of what is known as alternative specific covariates. The sequential logit model, in 
simpler terms, is two separate conventional binary logit estimations, completed right after 
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another. It is called this because the model proceeds in a sequential fashion, where the 
individual enters transitions, one after the other, depending on the previous decision made. 
We followed the procedure outlined by Rodriguez.69 For our research questions, we created 
two transition phases, following the conceptual model illustrated in Figure 2.3.  Transition 1 
consists of whether or not a LHD is involved in performing a screening service. If the answer 
is “yes,” then the LHD enters Transition 2. Focusing only on LHDs that chose to be 
“involved,” Transition 2 consists of whether or not the LHD directly performs the service or 
contracts it out.  Each transition represents two separate binary logit estimations, with the 
base for Transition 1 as “not involved” and the base for Transition 2 as “performed directly.” 
Each sequential logit model produces a separate log likelihood value. The log likelihood 
values from each binary logit estimation were then added together. That value was compared 
against the log likelihood value of the multinomial estimation. Using a manual log likelihood 
ratio test, the chi square statistic was not significant, providing further evidence that the log 
likelihood values of the sequential logit models and the multinomial model were not 
statistically different. The cancer multinomial model’s log likelihood value, for example, 
was -1117.2108, and the combined log likelihoods of the two sequential logits added up to  
-1118.4908. These values are almost identical. In fact, the multinomial model is actually 
slightly better than the sequential logit models. The less negative the log likelihood, the 
better.   
Furthermore, a deviance test was also conducted. The chi square statistic was not 
large and insignificant. If the null hypothesis, H0, has an insignificant p-value, then H0 cannot 
be rejected. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that “the fitting of the model of interest is 
substantially similar to that of the most completed model that can be built.”70 In other words, 
this means that the two transitions of the sequential logit models put together are almost 
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identical to the most completed model that can be built, which is the multinomial model. 
Hence, the multinomial model is not statistically different from the sequential logit models, 
and the sequential logit model is not superior. The results of the sequential logit estimations, 
as well as the deviance specification tests, provide further evidence that the Hausman test of 
the IIA assumption is indeed more than likely unsatisfactory for applied work.  
Limitations  
There are limitations of this study that should be noted. First, the study design is 
cross-sectional. Associations can only be inferred, and a cause-effect relationship should not 
be considered. Future studies could involve longitudinal data analysis. The 2016 NACCHO 
Profile Survey is expected to be released in the near future, and the AHRF is expected to 
have 2016 data released as well. Future studies could also consider our research question in 
respect to identifying trends over time. Furthermore, these results are only generalizable to 
county and multi-county LHDs. City, city-county, and multi-city LHDs were excluded from 
this study, and therefore the results cannot be generalized to all LHDs. However, most LHDs 
are on the county level and therefore, generalizability still carries considerable weight.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter provides an overview of the methods, tests, and models that we 
employed in Chapters 3 and 4. Specification tests helped to identify model fit. Discrete 
choice models of binomial logit and multinomial logit provide maximum likelihood 
estimation for our research questions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CANCER SCREENING 
Introduction 
Clinical preventive services, such as guideline recommended cancer screenings for cervical, 
breast, and colorectal cancers are crucial elements necessary for reaching national health targets. 
Although clinical preventive services, such as cancer screening, are established to save lives, many 
individuals do not utilitze these life-saving services. Approximately 75% of adults between 50 and 
64 years old and more than 50% of adults 65 years and older forego clinical preventive services.71 
The health consequences from under-utilization of cancer screening are extensive. Cancer is the 
second leading cause of death in the United States, and approximately 1 in 4 individuals will fatally 
succumb to some form of the disease.72  
Disparities in cancer screening rates are widely apparent. Rural-urban differences in breast and 
cervical cancer screening exist. According to recent research, despite a 10% increase in the overall 
participation in mammography, a rural-urban differences remain. Women in remote rural area have 
the highest likelihood of not receiving a timely mammogram.73 Furthermore, the same study 
illustrated that Pap smear testing did not improve over an eleven year interval. Major factors that 
were significantly associated with the lack of breast and cervical cancer screening among women 
regardless of geographic area, included low socioeconomic status (SES), advanced age, and 
minority race/ethnicity.73 In 2010, approximately 49% of all US counties lacked an OB-GYN 
physician.74 The highest ratios of OB-GYNs per 10,000 women were found in metropolitan areas, 
and the ratio declined as an area become more rural.74 In many rural areas, the family practice 
physicians provided 100% of the obstetrical and gynecologic care, and a large majority of women 
in rural areas do not receive recommended breast and cervical cancer screening services as part of 
preventative care.74 Rural-urban disparities are apparent in colorectal cancer screening services as 
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well. Gastroenterologists, general surgeons, and radiation oncologists traditionally provide 
colorectal cancer screening services, but many rural areas do not have these specialists. 
Approminately19% of LHDs provided this service in 2013, most likely because there is a lack of 
providers who can provide it.75,76 
The economic ramifications are as equally as considerable. Medical expenditures for cancer 
treatment rose sharply within the past decade, increasing from $56.8 billion in the year 2001 (in 
2011 USD) to $88.3 billion in 2011.77 National cost projections for cancer care for the year 2020 
are as high as $206.59 billion.78  
Because of the significant health, equity, and economic effects caused by cancer, health 
systems must think of innovative solutions in order to mitigate the cancer burden. Local health 
departments could be a part of the solution, since many entities are involved with providing cancer 
screening. Recent evidence illustrates that LHDs exhibit higher levels of involvement in disease 
screening compared to the delivery of comprehensive primary care services.13 In 2013, a majority 
of LHDs screened for cervical (88%) and breast cancer (83%).15 Less than half of LHDs surveyed 
screened for colon cancer (41%).15 However, other practitioners in the community can also provide 
cancer screening services. In the private sector, obstetricians and gynecologists (OB-GYNs), 
family medicine/general practice physicians, internal medicine physicians, as well as mid-levels 
such as physician assistants (PAs), nurse practitioners (NPs), and advanced practice registered 
nurses (APRNs) can provide them. Currently, there are approximately 48,610 OB-GYNs, 126,865 
family medicine/general practice physicians, and 177,779 internal medicine physicians in the 
United States.55 The total primary care physician workforce is 432,726. In the past decade, the 
trend in the number of PAs practicing has more than doubled79 and currently PAs total 91,982.80 
Nurse practitioners totaled 174,91881 and approximately 162,179 advanced practice registered 
34  
nurses were active in 2012.82 Furthermore, providers in FQHCs can also provide cancer screening 
services. In fact as of 2013, approximately 1,202 federally qualified health centers operated across 
the United States.56 
Through early cancer detection, screening activities could have sizeable impacts on 
morbidity, mortality, life expectancy, and contribute to bending the cost curve. Local health 
departments can have the ability to be involved in performing cancer screenings directly or by 
contracting this service out to other providers. A third option is to simply stay uninvolved and let 
others in the community who are independent of LHD funding provide the service. More people 
are now insured through the health insurance exchanges and Medicaid expansions, and some 
LHDs may reconsider focusing resources on more traditional public health activities,19 since these 
newly insured individuals may seek other providers in the community for healthcare needs. 
Because of a possible substitution effect, we hypothesize that a LHD’s choice to provide clinical 
preventive services such as cancer screening is contingent on the availability and supply of other 
healthcare providers in the community.  
Conceptual framework  
The conceptual framework for our study uses theories from the economic and 
organizational and management literature.  Political-economy theories explain how the political 
and economic environments can influence organizational structure. Discrete choice and random 
utility maximization (RUT) provide theoretical foundation for a LHD’s choice to be involved with 
cancer screening.  
Political-economy theories have several attributes applicable to public systems such as 
LHDs. Two fundamental resources of (1) legitimacy and power (i.e., political) and (2) production 
resources (i.e., economic)21 must be obtained by an organization in order to survive and yield 
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services. Secondly, this theory stresses the importance of the task environment. The task 
environment is composed of governmental and non-governmental organizations or interest groups 
who have a stake in the interest and agenda because they have control of resources needed by the 
organization. Furthermore, another attribute is resource dependence.28 As an organization becomes 
more dependent on resources controlled by an external entity, the influence of that entity on the 
organization increases as well. In addition, because an organization wants to achieve stability in 
the flow of external resources but also remain autonomous, the organization can strategize through 
competition or co-optation to survive.29 Lastly, within an organization, power and economic 
relations regulate how service technology is applied and how decision-making units are distributed 
among the organizational divisions. 
Furthermore, an organization such as a LHD may choose an option that produces the 
highest utility.  In economics, utility can be described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” provided 
by a product or service. Choice behavior is contingent upon the assumption that individuals make 
rational choices, but utility and choice prediction are not measured with complete accuracy. Hence, 
in random utility models,  
𝑢𝑖𝑗 =  𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
where utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑗, given to individual i by choice j is made up of a deterministic component, 𝑣𝑖𝑗, 
and an unobserved stochastic error component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .  
Methods  
We hypothesized that a LHD’s choice to be involved in cancer screening activities is 
contingent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community 
independent of LHD funding. Although OB-GYNs can perform breast and cervical cancer 
screening, and gastroenterologists, for instance, can perform colon cancer screening, specialists 
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were excluded from our study. They were excluded because these preventive services can be 
frequently performed by primary care physicians and midlevels. We assumed that if screening 
results are suspicious or pre-cancerous, then a specialist is referred. Therefore, we made the 
assumption that the cancer screening activity conducted in the LHD and other primary care settings 
practice primary prevention. Secondary and tertiary prevention would be conducted by specialists, 
and therefore, they were excluded.  
We used data from three sources. The primary dataset of interest was the National 
Association of County and City Officials (NACCHO) Profile Survey 2013. Hawaii and Rhode 
Island were not included in the survey because these states do not operate LHDs. We merged the 
NACCHO Profile with the NACCHO Boundary Files, which contains Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) County codes. We obtained the FIPS County codes in order to merge 
the NACCHO datasets with the Area Health Resource File (AHRF). Since our study was cross-
sectional in nature, focusing on 2013, we pulled data from the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 AHRF. 
We excluded LHDs classified as city, city-county, or multi-city because we wanted to focus on 
county and multi-county level LHDs only. Most LHDs in the US operate on the county level. 
Variables that contained count data were aggregated and population weighted averages for multi-
city jurisdictions were calculated. All three datasets were merged into one master dataset, used for 
the analyses. A total of 1,645 LHDs were contained in the master dataset.  
We used specification tests to first find the preferred model, comparing a binary logit 
estimation model with interaction terms and one without. We also conducted pairwise correlation 
tests. We also used multicollinearity tests and determined that all covariates should be kept in the 
model, for none of them were severely collinear, according to the variance of inflation factor (VIF). 
An insignificant LR test revealed that the parsimonious model without interaction terms is the 
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preferred model over the model with interaction terms. A binary logit estimation with the 
parsimonious model was estimated, with the dependent variable as, “not involved =0” and 
“involved=1.” Not involved was defined as, “the LHD is not involved in the provision of cancer 
screening, since others in the community independent of LHD funding already provides the 
service.” 
A multinomial logit model was then estimated with the three choices in the dependent 
variable. In our study, the choices a LHD would face would be to (1) remain uninvolved and let 
others in the community independent of LHD funding provide the service; (2) contract out the 
service; or (3) perform cancer screening directly. To test the independence of irrelevant alternative 
assumption (IIA), we implemented a Hausman test. It is important to point out, however, that 
research reveals that the Hausman tests performs poorly, even in large sample sizes.68 Because of 
the failed results, we then estimated the sequential logit models.   
 A sequential logit model can be described as if decisions were made in a sequence of 
stages or transitions. We followed the procedure outlined by Rodriguez.69 To answer our specific 
research question, we assumed that a LHD experiences two transition phases (see Figure 1).  
Transition 1 consists of whether a LHD is involved in performing a screening service. If it is 
involved, then the LHD enters Transition 2. Among only those LHDs that selected it is involved 
with the provision of cancer screening, it then enters the Transition 2. Transition 2 consists of 
whether the LHD directly performs the service or contracts it out.   
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Each transition represents two separate binary logit estimations. The base (omitted 
reference group) for Transition 1 is “not involved,” and for Transition 2, it was “perform directly.” 
Each sequential logit model produces separate log likelihood values that are then added together 
to get an overall sequential logit model log likelihood value. That value was manually compared 
against the log likelihood value of the multinomial estimation, using the LR test in Excel. It was 
determined that the log likelihood values of the sequential logit models and the multinomial model 
were almost identical, and it was not better than the multinomial model. The log likelihood of the 
cancer multinomial model was -1117.2108, and the summed log likelihoods of the two sequential 
logits added up to -1118.4908. The log likelihood values from the multinomial and the sequential 
logits are almost identical. Moreover, the multinomial model’s log likelihood is actually slightly 
better than the sequential logit models. In addition, a deviance test was carried out. The chi square 
statistic was small and insignificant, meaning that the multinomial model is not statistically 
different from the sequential logit models. Because the multinomial model is actually slightly 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework for the Discrete Choice Cancer Models. A LHD is first faced with 
the choice to become involved with the provision of cancer screening. By contrast, a LHD could also choose 
to be uninvolved in the screening activities since others (i.e., private practices, hospitals, FQHCs) 
independent of LHD funding provide the service to the community.  If the LHD does choose to be involved, 
then it has two options: (1) directly perform the service or (2) contract it out to other healthcare 
professionals in the community.  
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better than the sequential logit model (less negative log likelihood value), this provides further 
evidence that  “tests of the IIA assumption that are based on the estimation of a restricted choice 
set are unsatisfactory for applied work.”68  
Because we hypothesized that the choice to be involved in cancer screening activities is 
contingent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community, the 
dependent variable is a discrete choice (0,1). For the multinomial logit estimation, we extended 
the choice set to three options: (1) stay uninvolved and let others in the community provide the 
service (base); (2) contract out; or (3) directly perform the service. It is important to note that since 
the LHDs that participated in the NACCHO Profile Survey were allowed to select more than one 
option, we coded the dependent variables to account for only on choice per LHD. We also reflected 
the most logical choice. For example, if a LHD survey respondent selected that his or her agency 
performs the cancer screening activity directly and others in the community also provide the 
service, the code would generate a “1” for the choice of “performing directly.” Because of the 
inherent nature of the discrete choice models, only one choice per observation is required for the 
discrete choice models we employed.   
Our primary independent variables of interest are the other providers independent of LHD 
funding, which are primary care physicians and midlevels (i.e., physician assistants, nurse 
practitioners, and advanced practice nurses). We also controlled for institutional, financial, and 
community covariates that are consistent with previous public health services and systems 
research.11,23,26 
For healthcare supply factors, we controlled for primary care physicians per 10,000 
population, midlevels per 10,000 population, the presence of a federally qualified health center 
(FQHC), and total hospital beds per 100,000 population. Recent research illustrates that primary 
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care provision in LHDs is a function of the presence of a FQHC.13 Total hospitals beds per 100,000 
is used to reflect capacity, and is therefore a better measure for the potential substitution effect, as 
opposed to the total number of short term general hospitals.  
Sociodemographic factors are known to play roles in the provision of clinical or personal 
healthcare services, as low income, indigent, or uninsured populations rely on safety-nets for their 
healthcare needs. Therefore, we controlled for the percentages of non-white race, Hispanic 
ethnicity, people in poverty, and uninsured.  
LHD staffing and leadership variables were LHD staff per 10,000 population, percentage 
of LHDs with a clinician (MD, DO) executive director, and percentage of LHDs with a public 
health (MPH, DrPH) executive director. Previous research sheds light on the role of a clinician 
executive director on the provision of certain clinical preventive services.13 
Political-economy theories suggest that the political and economic environment can 
influence an organization’s agendas and choices. We included the presence of a local board of 
health (LBOH) to measure LHD autonomy and controlled for measurements for the state-local 
administrative relationship.  The variable was categorized into shared (omitted), local, or state 
governance.  
For LHD geographic location, we created three dummy variables of rural (omitted), urban 
(nonmetropolitan), and metropolitan, using the classification system established by the 2013 Rural 
Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) codes. RUCA categories 1–3 were coded as metro, categories 
4–7 were coded as urban (nonmetro), and categories 8-9 were coded as rural.59  
For LHD jurisdiction type, we included only county (omitted) or multi-county variables.  
Lastly, LHD jurisdiction population size served may play a role in the decision to become involved 
in cancer screening care, as smaller LHDs may be more likely contract out or share resources 
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across jurisdictions; or, larger LHDs may have the capacity to offer services beyond the traditional 
public health activities. We categorized this variables into 5 classifications based on population 
size served: < 25,000; 25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999, 100,000 – 499,999 and >500,000.  
Results 
Summary statistics for the study sample are presented in Table 3.1. Around 41% of LHDs 
provide cancer screening services. In terms of healthcare supply factors, on average, there are 5.8 
primary care physicians and 11.7 midlevels per 10,000 population. There are 8.9 LHD staff per 
10,000 population. Almost a fifth of LHDs surveyed (19.3%) have a public health executive 
director, and only 11.9% have a clinician director.  Furthermore, 70.3% of LHDs have a local board 
of health (LBOH).  More than half (66.8%) of LHDs have a local governance classification, while 
22.4% and 10.8% have a state and shared governance, respectively. The majority of the sample is 
composed of single county LHDs (88.9%). Jurisdiction population size served varies, with 36% of 
LHDs in our sample serving populations less than 25,000 and only 7% of LHDs serving population 
sizes larger than 500,000. The number of FQHCs delivery sites average 3.6 per 100,000 population. 
The percent of individuals in poverty and who are uninsured both average around 16%, while 15.2% 
of the sample are classified as non-white. Geographic region is divided into 38.9% of LHDs being 
located in metro areas, 38.6% in urban (nonmetro) areas, and only 13.9% in rural regions.  
Table 3.1 - Sample Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean (SD) Range  
Health care supply factors   
Primary care physicians per 10000 population 5.8 (3.2)  0-24.5 
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population 11.7 (7.6 )  0-100.9 
FQHC present in counties, % 58.6 0-128 
FQHC delivery sites per 100000 population 3.6 (8.8) 0-208.2 
Total hospital beds per 100000 population 324.9 (430.06)   0-7815.9 
General hospitals per 100000 population 4.63 (7.4) 0-86.2 
Demographic factors   
% White race 84.8 (14.6)    15.5-99 
% Non-white race 15.2 (14.6)  .99-84.5 
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% Hispanic ethnicity 7.1 (10.3)  .22-95.7 
% In poverty 16.6 (5.7) 3.8-41.1 
% Uninsured 16.5 (4.8) 6-36.8 
LHD service provision   
% LHDs providing cancer screening 41.3 0-100 
LHD staffing and leadership   
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population 8.9 (10.8) 0-195.8 
% LHDs with clinician (MD, DO) executive director 11.9 0-100 
% LHDs with public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director 19.3 0-100 
LHD governance characteristics   
Local board of health (LBOH) present 70.3 0-100 
State governance  22.4 0-100 
Local governance  66.8 0-100 
Shared governance  10.8 0-100 
LHDs by location   
% Metro 38.9 0-100 
% Urban (nonmetro) 38.6 0-100 
% Rural 13.9 0-100 
LHDs by jurisdiction   
% County 88.9 0-100 
% Multi-county 11.1 0-100 
LHD jurisdiction population size served   
Population size served < 25,000  36.0 0-100 
Population size served 25,000 - 49,999   20.1 0-100 
Population size served 50,000 - 99,999   15.8 0-100 
Population size served 100,000 - 499,999   21.0 0-100 
Population size served > 500,000 7.0 0-100 
N = 1,645 Local Health Departments     
            Abbreviations: FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department 
 
The results of the binary logit estimation are illustrated in Table 3.2, and the results of the 
multinomial model are presented in Table 3.3. The results of the sequential logit model for cancer 
screening are in Appendix II. The multinomial model proved to be a superior model to the 
sequential logit. Beta values and standard errors, as well as marginal effects (ME) along with 
standard errors are reported in the tables. It is crucial to point out that the signs of beta values may 
not have the same sign as the MEs. Primary interest is in how probabilities change as the covariates 
change, and MEs will provide that information.63 Therefore, interpretation from the estimations 
refer to the statistically significant MEs. Primary care physicians and midlevels per 10,000 
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population did not have significant beta values or MEs. The type of LHD director was not 
statistically significant either.  
However, other variables had statistically significant MEs. A unit increase in the 
percentage of the people in poverty increases a LHD’s probability to choose to be in involved in 
the delivery of cancer screening activity by 1.3% (p<.001). Furthermore, a LHD’s location in a 
metro area increases the probability of choosing to be involved in the delivery of this activity by 
10.2% (p<.05). Serving a jurisdiction population size between 50,000 to 99,999 and 99,999 -  
499,999 people increases the probability of delivering this activity by 14.4% (p<.001) and 11.7% 
(p<.05), respectively. By contrast, having a state or local governance decreases the probability of 
being involved with cancer screening by 30.6% (p<.001) and 43.6% (p<.001), respectively. 
Table 3.2 - Results of the Binary Logit Estimation of Whether or Not a LHD is Involved in                                                        
                  Delivering Cancer Screening Activity  
Variable  β SE ME SE 
Primary care physicians per 10000 population 0.009 0.024 0.002 0.005 
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population -0.002 0.010 -0.000 0.002 
FQHC present in counties 0.074 0.137 0.016 0.029 
Total hospital beds per 100000 population 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
% Non-white race -0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
% Hispanic ethnicity -0.013 0.007 -0.003 0.001 
% In poverty 0.060a 0.015 0.013a 0.003 
% Uninsured 0.032 0.017 0.007 0.004 
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population 0.019 0.007 0.004 0.001 
LHD with clinician (MD, DO) executive director -0.204 0.190 -0.042 0.039 
LHD has a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director 0.256 0.145 0.055 0.031 
Local board of health (LBOH) present 0.189 0.137 0.039 0.028 
Centralization (shared is omitted reference group)     
  State governance  -1.519a 0.252 -0.306a 0.043 
  Local governance  -2.084a 0.237 -0.436a 0.038 
LHD location (Rural is omitted reference group)     
   Metro 0.481b 0.216 0.102b 0.045 
   Urban (nonmetro) 0.128 0.191 0.027 0.040 
LHD jurisdiction population size served (<25,000 is 
omitted reference group) 
    
  Population size served 25,000 - 49,999   0.258 0.173 0.053 0.036 
  Population size served 50,000 - 99,999   0.683a 0.194 0.144a 0.041 
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  Population size served 100,000  - 499,999   0.559b 0.228 0.117b 0.048 
  Population size served > 500,000 0.608 0.327 0.128 0.070 
LHD jurisdiction (county is omitted reference group) 0.139 0.233 0.029 0.050 
Log  likelihood = -950.282778     
N = 1,565 Local Health Departments         
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health 
department 
aP<.001  
bP <.05 
 
 
Contract Out  
For the multinomial models, we first examined the choice of contracting out the cancer 
screening service to others in the community. The presence of a FQHC increases the probability 
of a LHD contracting out cancer screening services by 2% (p<.05), as opposed to staying 
uninvolved (base) because other healthcare providers already deliver the service. A unit increase 
in the percentage of uninsured individuals decreases the probability of contracting out by .38% 
(p<.05). Having a local or state governance decreases the probability of contracting out by 9% 
(p<.01), and 7% (p<.05), respectively. Furthermore, a multi-county jurisdiction decreases the 
probability of contracting out by 2.96% (p<.01).  
Perform Directly  
A unit increase in the percentage of the people in poverty decreases a LHD’s probability 
to choose to directly perform cancer screening service activity by 1.25% (p<.001), as opposed to 
staying uninvolved. Furthermore, a unit increase in the percentage of uninsured individuals 
increases the probability to directly perform cancer screening by 1.05% (p<.01). As the LHD staff 
per 10,000 LHD population increases, the probability increases by .34% (p<.05). Having a public 
health executive director increases the probability of performing cancer screening services directly 
by 6.59% (p<.05). Furthermore, having a local or state governance decreases the probability of 
performing cancer services directly by 22% (p<.001) and 35.9% (p<.001), respectively. LHD 
location in a metro area increases the probability of performing this service directly by 10.56% 
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(p<.05). Serving jurisdiction population sizes of 50,000 – 99,999 and 100,000 – 499,999 increases 
the probability of directly performing cancer screening activities by 13.1% (p<.01) and 9.8% 
(p<.05), respectively.  
Table 3.3  - Results of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of Cancer Screening Delivery Choice 
 
Variable  
Contract out Perform Directly 
  β SE ME SE β SE ME SE 
Primary care physicians per 10000 
population 
-0.0239 0.0587 -0.0009 0.0018 0.0105 0.0247 0.0025 0.0051 
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 
10000 population 
0.0103 0.0208 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0099 -0.0009 0.0020 
FQHC present in counties 0.7141 0.3809 0.0209c 0.0105 0.0182 0.1398 -0.0060 0.0286 
Total hospital beds per 100000 
population 
0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
% Non-white race 0.0083 0.0126 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0066 0.0051 -0.0015 0.0010 
% Hispanic ethnicity -0.0046 0.0213 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0132 0.0071 -0.0027 0.0015 
% In poverty 0.0415 0.0365 0.0004 0.0011 0.0630a 0.0148 0.0125a 0.0029 
% Uninsured -0.0994c 0.0486 -0.0038c 0.0016 0.0429c 0.0173 0.0105b 0.0035 
LHD staff per 10000 LHD 
population 
0.0238c 0.0118 0.0005 0.0003 0.0179b 0.0067 0.0034c 0.0013 
LHD with clinician (MD, DO) 
executive director 
-0.0623 0.4449 0.0013 0.0141 -0.2241 0.1950 -0.0450 0.0383 
LHD has a public health (MPH, 
DrPH) executive director 
-0.2504 0.3901 -0.0116 0.0103 0.2938c 0.1474 0.0659c 0.0310 
Local board of health (LBOH) 
present 
0.6065 0.4013 0.0152 0.0101 0.1529 0.1393 0.0233 0.0280 
Centralization (shared is omitted 
reference group) 
        
  State governance  -2.9913a 0.6445 -0.0915b 0.0298 -1.4272a 0.2543 -0.2200a 0.0478 
  Local governance  -2.5481a 0.4231 -0.0762c 0.0299 -2.0289a 0.2407 -0.3594a 0.0432 
LHD location (Rural is omitted 
reference group) 
        
   Metro 0.0751 0.6800 -0.0052 0.0217 0.5101b 0.2196 0.1056c 0.0451 
   Urban (nonmetro) -0.1389 0.6174 -0.0065 0.0186 0.1438 0.1939 0.0321 0.0402 
LHD jurisdiction population size 
served (<25,000 is omitted 
reference group) 
        
  Population size served 25,000 - 
49,999   
0.6259 0.5176 0.0143 0.0142 0.2352 0.1760 0.0401 0.0351 
  Population size served 50,000 - 
99,999   
0.8478 0.5757 0.0146 0.0159 0.6770a 0.1981 0.1309b 0.0406 
  Population size served 100,000 - 0.8923 0.6496 0.0189 0.0190 0.5302b 0.2331 0.0982c 0.0476 
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499,999   
  Population size served > 500,000 1.1846 0.8320 0.0312 0.0321 0.5428 0.3360 0.0947 0.0696 
LHD jurisdiction (county is omitted 
reference group) 
-1.3668 0.9033 -0.0296b 0.0107 0.2394 0.2364 0.0641 0.0497 
Log  likelihood =  -1117.2108          
N = 1,565 Local Health 
Departments 
                
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department 
 aP <.001  
bP <.01  
cP <.05  
 
Discussion  
The number of primary care physicians and midlevels per 10,000 population were not 
statistically significant in either the binary or multinomial logit estimations. This is a surprising 
finding, as we hypothesized that the choice to become involved in cancer screening activities in 
the LHD was contingent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the 
community.  
The type of LHD director was not statistically significant in the binary logit model, but in 
the multinomial model, having a LHD director with a public health degree (MPH, DrPH) increased 
the probability of performing the cancer screening activity directly. A LHD director with a public 
health degree may see performing cancer screening services directly as part of the mission of 
public health through prevention and early detection. The LHD director may have some influence 
on the decision to be involved with providing cancer screening directly, by choosing to perform 
cancer screening directly or contracting out the service.  
The FQHC is known to act as a safety-net for impoverished people with low incomes. The 
results of both estimations provide statistically significant evidence that as the percentage of people 
in poverty increases, so does the LHD’s probability of staying uninvolved in the delivery of cancer 
screening activity. The most logical explanation for this is because impoverished individuals may 
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seek care from other providers and health systems such as FQHCs instead. In fact, this postulate 
is supported by results from the multinomial logit estimation. The presence of a FQHC increases 
the probability of contracting out cancer screening services. This may be because LHD directors 
may be aware of the value of contracting out this service to a FQHC because the impoverished 
individuals are more likely to go to the FQHC to receive the service.   
In addition, as the percentage of uninsured individuals increase, the probability of a LHD 
contracting out or directly performing cancer screening services declines with statistical 
significance. In other words, as the percentage of uninsured individuals increase, the probability 
of a LHD being staying uninvolved and letting others in the community provide cancer screening 
increase. This observation may be due in part to the National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early 
Detection Program (NBCCEDP), as this program entails a network of various health systems and 
providers who already provide this service in the community. The NBCCEDP is a federal program 
through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that “provides low-income, 
uninsured, and underserved women access to timely breast and cervical cancer screening and 
diagnostic services.”83 The NBCCEDP is composed of a network of more than 22,000 clinical 
providers in various health systems that include LHDs, FQHCs, private practices, safety-net 
hospitals, and other health systems. More recently, the CDC funded the Colorectal Cancer Control 
Program (CRCCP) in 2009 with goals to increase colorectal cancer screening rates in adults aged 
50 to 75. These cancer screening programs entail partnerships and collaborative capacity among 
the various health systems. Every LHD works with this network of clinical providers to provide 
the services.83 
Geographic location also plays a role in a LHD’s decision. The binary logit estimation 
revealed that a LHD that is located in a metro area has a higher probability of choosing to be 
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involved in the delivery of this service. The multinomial model revealed the specific choice — a 
LHD location in a metro area increases the probability of performing this service directly by 
10.56%. This may be because LHDs that serve larger jurisdictions may have adequate resources 
and choose to deliver this service regardless of community need.13  
In addition to geographic location, jurisdiction population size served also is statistically 
significant. The binary logit model first revealed a statistically significant association between 
jurisdiction population sizes served of 50,000 to 99,999 and 100,000 to 499,999 and the increasing 
the probability of a LHD’s choice to be involved. The multinomial logit model revealed that 
serving jurisdictions with those population sizes increases the probability of performing cancer 
screening activities directly. This is perhaps because larger LHDs have the resources, staff, and 
capacity to perform this screening service in-house. This conjecture is supported by the fact that 
as the LHD staff per 10,000 LHD population increases, the probability of performing cancer 
screening directly increases by .34%. It is interesting to point out, however, that jurisdictions with 
population sizes smaller than 25,000 and greater than 500,000 were not statistically significant. 
Perhaps smaller, low resource communities may rely on the presence of a FQHC for cancer 
screening services. On the other end, LHDs that serve large jurisdictions may simply have enough 
resources, staff, and funding to directly perform cancer screening.  
Moreover, the binomial logit estimations revealed that having a state or local governance 
decreases the probability of being involved with cancer screening. The results of the multinomial 
models revealed that a local or state governance decreases the probabilities of both contracting out 
and directly performing the screening activity. This implies that the LHD with a state or local 
governance chooses to be uninvolved. A previous study by Mays & Smith illustrated that public 
health spending was 24% lower in centralized state agencies, as opposed to independent local 
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agencies.84 It may be possible that centralized state LHDs may be more concerned with finances 
and budgets, and local agencies may be more knowledgeable of the specific community needs and 
availability of private providers compared to the state agencies.  
Lastly, having a multi-county jurisdiction type decreases the probability of contracting out 
the service by almost 3% as opposed to staying uninvolved and allowing others independent of 
LHD funding provide the service to community residents. This finding could possibly be explained 
by the fact that multi-county LHDs may be more aware of the other healthcare providers and health 
systems in their jurisdiction, since their territory spans multiple counties, forcing them to 
communicate with other LHDs. This might also allow multi-county LHDs to make more informed 
decisions, partially influencing the decision to remain uninvolved.  
Limitations  
There are some limitations of this study to this study. First, this study is cross-sectional in 
nature. A cause-effect relationship should not be considered. Future studies could involve 
longitudinal data analysis, as the 2016 NACCHO Profile Survey is due to be released, and the 
AHRF is expected to have 2016 data released as well in the near future. Furthermore, these results 
are only generalizable to county and multi-county LHDs However, most LHDs are on the county 
single level. Lastly, a final limitation is that gynecologists were not included in the primary care 
physician variable since debate on classifying gynecologists as primary care physicians as opposed 
to specialists/surgeons is on-going; therefore, including gynecologists in the primary care variable 
in a future study may have an impact on statistical significance.   
Conclusion 
Although the results suggest that the decision to become involved with cancer screening 
activities is not dependent on the availability or supply of physicians or midlevels, we still gained 
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valuable information. Several organizational, institutional, and environmental characteristics are 
associated with a LHD’s decision to provide cancer screening activities either through performing 
it directly or contracting it out. The presence of a public health director, the number of LHD staff, 
metropolitan location, jurisdiction population size served, as well as jurisdiction type, are all 
significantly associated with the LHD’s decision. An overall trend suggests that as population size 
increases, so does the probability of involvement with cancer screening. This study has important 
public health ramifications, as Mays and Smith previously revealed over a 13 year time period, 
that for every 10% increase in public health spending, cancer mortality fell by 1.1 percent.84 In 
conclusion, these findings have viable practice and policy significance that will greatly benefit the 
public’s health now and in the future.   
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CHAPTER 4  
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE SCREENING 
Introduction 
Heart disease is the number one cause of death in the United States, and stroke comes 
in third. Approximately, 27.6 million people are currently diagnosed with CVD, and as of 
2013, 611,105 individuals died from it.85 Clinical preventive services, such as cardiovascular 
disease screenings, are fundamental for protecting the public’s health and reaching national 
health targets, such as Healthy People 2020. Cardiovascular disease (CVD) screenings help 
detect heart conditions that have the potential to lead to a stroke or heart attack and include 
physical examinations and lifestyle discussion, evaluation of family history, and blood tests 
for cholesterol, lipid, and triglyceride levels.  Despite the established effectiveness of clinical 
preventive services, including CVD screening, around three-fourths of adults between 50 
and 64 years old and more than half of adults 65 years and older forego clinical preventive 
services.71  
The economic burden from CVD on the US healthcare system is significant, as 
almost every 6 healthcare dollars is spent on CVD. In 2011, the nation’s healthcare system 
spent almost $1 billion a day in medical costs, and by the year 2030, yearly direct medical 
costs for CVD and lost productivity costs could increase to over $818 billion and $275 billion 
dollars, respectively.86  
In addition to a large economic burden, equity issues arise, as racial and ethnic 
disparities with CVD mortality are higher in individuals with low educations and African 
American populations87 in addition to individuals who reside in rural areas, especially those 
who live in the South.88 
 Despite the paramount importance of CVD screening, many individuals do not have 
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access to such services. Disparities in the capacity and distribution of private providers who 
provide CVD screening are apparent. Evidence illustrates that CVD screening in rural areas 
is suboptimal.89 The suboptimal rates are also due in part to primary care workforce shortages 
that plague many rural areas and other medically underserved areas. Lack of insurance is 
also a factor that contributes to suboptimal CVD screening rates. Low CVD rates have 
profound effects on population health, as the lack of detection of CVD increases the amount 
of people who are at risk for fatal heart attacks and strokes.  
In the private medical sector, several primary care physicians and midlevels can 
provide CVD screening. Family medicine/general practice physicians, internal medicine 
physicians, as well as mid-levels such as physician assistants (PAs), nurse practitioners 
(NPs), and advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) can provide CVD screening 
services. As of 2012, there were 27,076 cardiologists90, 126,865 family medicine/general 
practice physicians, and 177,779 internal medicine physicians in the United States.55 The 
primary care physician workforce totals 432,726 practitioners. In addition, the trend in the 
number of PAs practicing has more than doubled in the last decade79 and currently PAs total 
91,982.80 Nurse practitioners total 174,91881 and nearly 162,179 advanced practice 
registered nurses were active in 2012.82 Furthermore, practitioners in FQHCs can also 
provide CVD screening services. In 2013, roughly 1,202 federally qualified health centers 
operated across the United States.56 
 At present, policies from the ACA are pushing to reduce excessive emergency 
department usage and hospital readmissions. Cardiovascular related events, such as 
congestive heart failure among adults, are cited as common conditions for the emergency 
department91 as well as hospital readmissions.92 LHDs that offer clinical preventive 
screening activities, such as CVD screening, could possibly play a role in mitigating 
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excessive ED visits and hospital readmissions, especially in low resourced urban and rural 
communities. Cardiovascular screening, done in the early stages, can slow the progression 
of disease. 
Exploring innovative and cost-effective ways to ensure access to CVD screening will 
take efforts from both private healthcare and public health systems, and LHDs may play a 
major role in finding the solution.  Low resource communities and uninsured individuals 
who do not have access to a FQHC could rely on LHDs for this service. On the contrary, 
since more people are now becoming insured through the health insurance exchanges and 
Medicaid expansions, LHDs may reconsider the role of offering clinical preventive services 
and let others in the community provide them instead.  
It is possible that a substitution effect among providers could be occurring, and it is 
imperative to understand this possible substitution effect. Therefore, we hypothesize that a 
LHD’s choice to provide CVD screening is conditional on the availability and supply of 
private healthcare providers in the community.  
Conceptual framework  
This study is supported several organizational and management theories. Political-
economy provides a framework on how the political and economic environments can 
influence organizational structure and decisions. Random utility maximization (RUT) 
provide theoretical foundation for a LHD’s choice to be involved with CVD disease 
screening.  
The political-economy theories have several attributes that are transferable to public 
agencies such as LHDs. Resources of (1) legitimacy and power (i.e., political) and (2) 
production resources (i.e., economic)21 must be attained by an organization in order to 
survive and produce services. Furthermore, there is influence from the task environment. 
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The task environment is made up of governmental and non-governmental organizations, 
interest groups, and stakeholders who have control of resources needed by the organization. 
Furthermore, another attribute is resource dependence.28 As an organization becomes more 
dependent on resources controlled by an external entity, the influence of that entity on the 
organization increases as well. Furthermore, an organization strives to achieve stability in 
the flow of external resources but also still have autonomy. Therefore, the organization can 
strategize through competition or co-optation to survive.29 Lastly, within an organization, 
power and economic relations control the application of service technology and how 
decision-making units are distributed among the organizational divisions. 
Furthermore, an organization such as a LHD may choose an option that produces the 
highest utility.  In economics, utility can be described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” 
provided by a product or service. Choice behavior is contingent upon the assumption that 
individuals make rational choices but utility and choice prediction are not measured with 
complete accuracy. Hence, in random utility models,  
𝑢𝑖𝑗 =  𝑣𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗  
where utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑗, given to individual i by choice j is made up of a deterministic 
component, 𝑣𝑖𝑗, and an unobserved stochastic error component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .  
Methods  
We hypothesized that a LHD’s choice to be involved in CVD screening activities is 
dependent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community 
independent of LHD funding. Although cardiologists can perform CVD disease screening, 
they were excluded from our study because this preventive services is commonly performed 
by primary care physicians and midlevels. We also assumed that if the screening results 
require specialized attention or treatment, then the cardiologist is referred. Therefore, we 
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made the assumption that CVD screening performed in the LHD or in other primary care 
settings practice primary prevention. Secondary and tertiary prevention would be conducted 
by a cardiologist, so we excluded them from the analysis.   
The final dataset was created from three sources. The primary dataset of interest was 
the National Association of County and City Officials (NACCHO) Profile Survey 2013. 
Rhode Island and Hawaii were not included in the survey because they do not have LHDs. 
We merged the NACCHO Profile with the NACCHO Boundary Files. The Boundary Files 
contain Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) County codes. We obtained the 
FIPS County codes in order to merge the NACCHO datasets with the Area Health Resource 
File (AHRF). Since our cross-sectional study focused on the year 2013, we pulled data from 
the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 AHRF files. We only analyzed county and multi-county level 
LHDs and excluded LHDs classified as city, city-county, or multi-city. For multi-city 
jurisdictions, variables that contained count data were aggregated and population weighted 
averages were calculated. A total of 1,645 LHDs were contained in the master dataset. 
We conducted several specification tests to determine the preferred model, We first 
compared a binary logit estimation model with interaction terms and one without 
(parsimonious). We also conducted pairwise correlation tests. We determined that all 
covariates should be kept in the model. No variables were severely collinear, according to 
the variance of inflation factor (VIF). The parsimonious model and the model with 
interaction terms are illustrated in Appendix I. An insignificant LR test revealed that the 
parsimonious model is the preferred model. A binary logit estimation with the parsimonious 
model was estimated, with the dependent variable as, “not involved =0” and “involved=1.” 
Not involved is defined as the LHD is not involved in the provision of CVD screening, since 
others in the community independent of LHD funding already provides the service.  
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A multinomial logit model estimation was then conducted, with the three choices in 
the dependent variable. In our study, the choices a LHD might face would be to (1) remain 
uninvolved and let others in the community independent of LHD funding provide the service; 
(2) contract out the service; or (3) perform CVD screening directly. To test the independence 
of irrelevant alternative assumption (IIA) inherent in multinomial models, we applied a 
Hausman test (see Appendix I). It is important to point out, however, that recent research 
reveals that the Hausman tests performs poorly, even in large sample sizes.68 Because of the 
failed results of the test, we executed sequential logit estimations, also known as hierarchical 
logit estimations. 
 A sequential logit model is structured with decisions made in a stages. We followed 
the procedure outlined by Rodriguez.69 We assumed that a LHD experiences two transition 
phases (see Figure 1).  Transition 1 consists of whether (or not) a LHD is involved in 
performing a screening service. If it is involved, then the LHD enters Transition 2. Among 
only those LHDs that selected “yes” it is involved with the provision of CVD screening, they 
then enter the next transition. Transition 2 consists of whether (or not) the LHD directly 
performs the service or contracts it out.   
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Each transition phase represents two separate binary logit estimations. Transition 1, 
the base (omitted reference group) is “not involved,” and for Transition 2, it was “perform 
directly.” Each sequential logit model generates its own separate log likelihood values that 
are then added together.  The overall sequential logit model log likelihood value can then be 
calculated. The summed value would then be manually and computationally compared 
against the log likelihood value of the multinomial estimation. However, for the 
cardiovascular disease screening model, the sequential logit model for Transition 1 was not 
statistically significant, and Transition 2 could not be estimated because of too many missing 
values. The multinomial logit model proved to be the superior model.   
Because we hypothesized that the choice to be involved in CVD screening activities 
is conditional on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community, 
the dependent variable is a discrete choice (0,1). For the multinomial logit estimation, we 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework for the Discrete Choice CVD Models. A LHD is first faced with the 
choice to become involved with the provision of cardiovascular disease screening. By contrast, a LHD 
could also choose to be uninvolved in the screening activities, letting others (i.e., private practices, 
hospitals, FQHCs) independent of LHD funding provide the service to the community.  If the LHD does 
choose to be involved, then it has two options: (1) directly perform the service or (2) contract out the service 
to other healthcare professionals in the community.  
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increased the choice set to three choices: (1) stay uninvolved and let others in the community 
provide the service (base); (2) contract out; or (3) directly perform the service. It is important 
to note that the LHD survey respondent for the NACCHO Profile was allowed to select more 
than one option. To correct for only one choice per LHD, we coded the dependent variables 
to account for the most logical decision. For example, if a LHD survey respondent selected 
that his or her agency performs the CVD screening activity directly and selected that others 
in the community also provide the service, the code would generate a “1” for the choice of 
“directly performing.” Only one choice per observation is required for the discrete choice 
models.   
Our primary independent variables of interest are the other providers in the 
community independent of LHD funding. Those are primary care physicians and midlevels 
(i.e., physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and advanced practice nurses). Besides these 
providers, we also controlled for institutional, financial, and community covariates 
previously investigated in other public health services and systems research studies.11,23,24  
For healthcare supply factors, we controlled for primary care physicians per 10,000 
population,  midlevels per 10,000 population,  total hospital beds per 100,000 population, 
and the presence of a federally qualified health center (FQHC) since recent research 
illustrates that primary care provision in LHDs is a function of the presence of a FQHC.13 
The total hospitals beds per 100,000 is a reflection of capacity, and is therefore a better 
measure for the potential substitution effect, as opposed to the total number of short term 
general hospitals.  
We controlled for sociodemographic factors of the percentages of non-white race, 
Hispanic ethnicity, in poverty, and uninsured. These variables are known to affect the 
provision of clinical or personal healthcare services, as low income, uninsured, and indigent 
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populations rely on safety-nets for their healthcare needs. 
LHD staffing and leadership variables were LHD staff per 10,000 population, 
percentage of LHDs with a clinician (MD, DO) executive director, and percentage of LHDs 
with a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director. Previous research sheds light on the 
role of an increasing number of LHD staff per 10,000 and a clinician executive director on 
the provision of directly performing cardiovascular disease screening in LHDs.13 
The political and economic environment can influence an organization’s choices. 
Therefore, we included the presence of a local board of health (LBOH) to measure LHD 
autonomy and controlled for the state-local administrative relationship.  Previous studies 
have documented the effect of governance characteristics, such as centralized governance 
and its association with spending decisions.84 This variable was categorized into shared 
(omitted), local, or state governance.  
For LHD geographic location, three dummy variables of rural (omitted), urban 
(nonmetro), and metro were created, following the classification system established by the 
2013 Rural Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) codes. RUCA categories 1–3 were coded as 
metro, categories 4–7 were coded as urban (nonmetro), and categories 8-9 were coded as 
rural.59  
For LHD jurisdiction type, we included only single county (omitted) or multi-county 
variables. The most common type of LHD in the United States is the county LHD. 
LHD jurisdiction population size served may play a role in the decision to become 
involved in CVD screening, as smaller LHDs may be more likely contract out or share 
resources across jurisdictions. Furthermore, larger LHDs may have adequate capacity to 
offer services beyond the traditional public health activities. Thus, we categorized this 
variables into 5 categories: population size served < 25,000; 25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999, 
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100,000 – 499,999 and >500,000. 
Results 
Summary statistics for the study sample are illustrated in Table 4.1. Less than half 
(41.3%) of LHDs provide CVD screening services. The majority of the sample is composed 
of single county LHDs (88.9%), in which only 11.1% are multi-county LHDs. A FQHC is 
present in 58.6% of the counties sampled. The number of total hospital beds per 100,000 
population average around 325 beds, and there are 5.8 primary care physicians and 11.7 
midlevels per 10,000 population. The majority of the sample is composed of individuals who 
are classified as “white race” (84.8%), while 15.2% of the study sample are classified as non-
white race. Furthermore, over 16% of the sample is considered to be in poverty or uninsured. 
Approximately 36% of LHDs in the sample served populations less than 25,000, and only 
7% of LHDs served population sizes larger than 500,000. On average, there are 5.8 primary 
care physicians and 11.7 midlevels per 10,000 population. Geographic region is divided into 
three main classifications, with 38.9% of LHDs located in metro areas, 38.6% in urban 
(nonmetro), and only 13.9% in rural regions.  
Table 4.1 - Sample Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean (SD) Range  
Health care supply factors   
Primary care physicians per 10000 population 5.8 (3.2)  0-24.5 
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population 11.7 (7.6 )  0-100.9 
FQHC present in counties, % 58.6 0-128 
FQHC delivery sites per 100000 population 3.6 (8.8) 0-208.2 
Total hospital beds per 100000 population 324.9 (430.06)   0-7815.9 
General hospitals per 100000 population 4.63 (7.4) 0-86.2 
Demographic factors   
% White race 84.8 (14.6)    15.5-99 
% Non-white race 15.2 (14.6)  .99-84.5 
% Hispanic ethnicity 7.1 (10.3)  .22-95.7 
% In poverty 16.6 (5.7) 3.8-41.1 
% Uninsured 16.5 (4.8) 6-36.8 
LHD service provision   
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% LHDs providing CVD screening 29.3 0-100 
LHD staffing and leadership   
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population 8.9 (10.8) 0-195.8 
% LHDs with clinician (MD, DO) executive director 11.9 0-100 
% LHDs with public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director 19.3 0-100 
LHD governance characteristics   
Local board of health (LBOH) present 70.3 0-100 
State governance  22.4 0-100 
Local governance  66.8 0-100 
Shared governance  10.8 0-100 
LHDs by location   
% Metro 38.9 0-100 
% Urban (nonmetro) 38.6 0-100 
% Rural 13.9 0-100 
LHDs by jurisdiction   
% County 88.9 0-100 
% Multi-county 11.1 0-100 
LHD jurisdiction population size served   
Population size served < 25,000  36.0 0-100 
Population size served 25,000 - 49,999   20.1 0-100 
Population size served 50,000 - 99,999   15.8 0-100 
Population size served 100,000 - 499,999   21.0 0-100 
Population size served > 500,000 7.0 0-100 
N = 1,645 Local Health Departments     
Abbreviations: FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department 
 
The results of the binary logit estimation are illustrated in Table 4.2. Results of the 
multinomial model are presented in Table 4.3. The results of the sequential logit model are 
not included in this paper, since the multinomial model proved to be a superior model to the 
sequential logits, and the second transition could not be computed due to too many missing 
observations.   
Beta values and standard errors, as well as marginal effects (MEs) along with 
standard errors are reported. The signs of beta values may not have the same sign as the MEs. 
Therefore, our main interest is in how probabilities change as the covariates change. MEs 
will provide that information.63 Therefore, interpretation of the results refer to the 
statistically significant MEs.  
62  
The results of the binary logit estimation are illustrated in Table 4.2. Referring to the 
marginal effects, the presence of a FQHC decreases the probability of being involved in 
delivering cardiovascular disease screening services, as opposed to choosing to not be 
involved by 8.93% (p<.001). Likewise, a unit increase in the percentage of non-white race 
decreases the probability of being involved by .35% (p<.001). An increase in the number of 
LHD staff employed per 10,000 population increases the probability of being involved in 
CVD screening by .45% (p<.001). However, having a clinician executive director of a LHD 
decreases involvement with CVD screening by 10.64% (p<.01). Furthermore, having a state 
or local governance decreases the probability of being involved by 28.96% (p<.001) and 
27.31% (p<.001), respectively. On the other hand, LHDs with jurisdiction population sizes 
of 50,000-99,000, 100,000-499,999 and greater than 500,000 significantly increases the 
probability of being involved with CVD screening by 10.91% (p<.01), 18.3% (p<.01), and 
33.5% (p<.001), respectively.  
Table 4.2 - Results of the Binary Logit Estimation of Whether or Not a LHD is Involved in   
                  Delivering CVD Screening Activity 
Variable  β SE ME SE 
FQHC present in counties -0.466a 0.145 -0.0893a 0.0276 
Total hospital beds per 100000 population 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Primary care physicians per 10000 population -0.051 0.026 -0.0097 0.0049 
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population 0.012 0.010 0.0024 0.0019 
% Non-white race -0.018a 0.006 -0.0035a 0.0010 
% Hispanic ethnicity -0.005 0.007 -0.0010 0.0014 
% In poverty 0.063 0.015 0.0120 0.0028 
% Uninsured 0.019 0.018 0.0037 0.0034 
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population 0.024a 0.007 0.0045a 0.0013 
LHD with clinician (MD, DO) executive director -0.617b 0.213 -0.1064b 0.0325 
LHD has a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive 
director 
0.182 0.152 
0.0353 
0.0300 
Local board of health (LBOH) present 0.242 0.145 0.0450 0.0264 
Centralization (shared is omitted reference group)     
  State governance  -1.321a 0.221 -0.2896a 0.0478 
  Local governance  -1.232a 0.200 -0.2731a 0.0454 
LHD location (Rural is omitted reference group)     
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   Metro 0.439 0.228 0.0849 0.0445 
   Urban (nonmetro) 0.164 0.202 0.0313 0.0388 
LHD jurisdiction population size served (<25,000 is 
omitted reference group) 
  
 
 
  Population size served 25,000 - 49,999   0.267 0.185 0.0452 0.0314 
  Population size served 50,000 - 99,999   0.603b 0.207 0.1091b 0.0376 
  Population size served 100,000 - 499,999   0.744b 0.247 0.1380b 0.0458 
  Population size served > 500,000 1.638a 0.351 0.3353a 0.0696 
LHD jurisdiction (county is omitted reference group) -0.005 0.249 -0.0009 0.0473 
N = 1,547 Local Health Departments     
Log  likelihood =  -874.3417         
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health 
department 
aP <.001  
bP <.01  
Contract Out 
The results of the multinomial logit estimation are presented in Table 3. There were 
only two statistically significant variables with the choice to contract out. When focusing on 
the choice to contract out service, the presence of a FQHC increases the probability of a LHD 
contracting out CVD screening services by .1% (p<.05) as opposed to staying uninvolved. 
In addition, being a multi-county LHD decreases the probability of contracting out this 
service by .1% (p<.05) as well.   
Perform Directly 
Moreover, having a FQHC in the county decreases the probability of a LHD’s choice 
to directly perform cardiovascular screening service activity by 10% (p<.001), as opposed 
choosing to be uninvolved. Furthermore, a unit increase in the number of primary care 
physicians per 10,000 decreases the probability of a LHD choosing to directly perform this 
service by approximately 1% (p<.01). The presence of a clinician executive director 
decreases the probability of directly performing CVD services by 10.72%. As the percentage 
of non-white individuals increase, the probability decreases by .34% (p<.001). In addition, 
having a state or local governance decreases the probability of directly performing the 
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service by 28% and 26.9%, respectively. On the contrary, as the percentage of people in 
poverty increases, the probability of directly performing cardiovascular disease screening 
increases by 1.17% (p<.001). As the number of LHD staff per 10,000 population increases, 
the probability of directly performing this service also increases by .43% (p<.001). 
Jurisdiction population size served of 100,000 to 499,999 and greater than 500,000 increases 
the probability of directly performing CVD screening by 13% (p<.01) and 33.8% (p<.001). 
Lastly, LHD location in a metro area increases the probability of directly performing this 
service by 8.7% (p<.05). 
Table 4.3  - Results of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of CVD Screening Activity Delivery Choice (Not involved 
(Base), Contract Out, or Perform Directly) 
Variable  
Contract out   Perform directly 
β SE ME SE   β SE ME SE 
Primary care physicians per 
10000 population 
0.0518 0.1025 0.0006 0.0008  -0.0548c 0.0264 -0.0104c 0.0049 
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) 
per 10000 population 
0.0275 0.0362 0.0002 0.0003  0.0119 0.0100 0.0022 0.0019 
FQHC present in counties 1.3643 0.8648 0.0099c 0.0050  -0.5125a 0.1465 -0.0996a 0.0274 
Total hospital beds per 
100000 population 
-0.0016 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
% Non-white race -0.0296 0.0308 -0.0002 0.0003  -0.0183b 0.0056 -0.0034a 0.0010 
% Hispanic ethnicity -0.0070 0.0392 0.0000 0.0003  -0.0054 0.0075 -0.0010 0.0014 
% In poverty 0.0584 0.0658 0.0003 0.0005  0.0632a 0.0152 0.0117a 0.0028 
% Uninsured -0.0355 0.0869 -0.0003 0.0007  0.0211 0.0180 0.0041 0.0034 
LHD staff per 10000 LHD 
population 
0.0290 0.0185 0.0002 0.0002  0.0235b 0.0068 0.0043a 0.0012 
LHD with clinician (MD, DO) 
executive director 
-0.0902 0.8861 0.0008 0.0076  -0.6369b 0.2163 -0.1072a 0.0320 
LHD has a public health 
(MPH, DrPH) executive 
director 
-0.0590 0.7275 -0.0010 0.0056  0.1864 0.1533 0.0358 0.0298 
Local board of health (LBOH) 
present 
0.7138 0.8530 0.0044 0.0050  0.2297 0.1464 0.0406 0.0262 
Centralization (shared is 
omitted reference group) 
         
  State governance  -1.7313 1.2942 -0.0092 0.0107  -1.3172a 0.2218 -0.2813a 0.0477 
  Local governance  -0.9337 0.8836 -0.0045 0.0107  -1.2426a 0.2015 -0.2689a 0.0454 
LHD location (Rural is 
omitted reference group) 
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   Metro -0.2557 1.2681 -0.0033 0.0111  0.4549c 0.2299 0.0874c 0.0441 
   Urban (nonmetro) -0.2776 1.0821 -0.0026 0.0081  0.1772 0.2041 0.0341 0.0385 
LHD jurisdiction population 
size served (<25,000 is 
omitted reference group) 
         
  Population size served 
25,000 - 49,999   
0.4734 0.9424 0.0033 0.0079  0.2645 0.1865 0.0427 0.0310 
  Population size served 
50,000 - 99,999   
-13.193 618.259 -0.0068 0.0047  0.6445b 0.2083 0.1174 1.0428 
  Population size served 
100,000 - 499,999   
0.9979 1.2756 0.0076 0.0134  0.7395b 0.2497 0.1313b 0.0455 
  Population size served > 
500,000 
0.8399 1.7769 0.0012 0.0131  1.6758a 0.3540 0.3376 0.0698 
LHD jurisdiction (county is 
omitted reference group) 
-
13.9866 
702.4286 -0.0099c 0.0031  0.0416 0.2500 0.0111 0.0475 
Log  likelihood =  -922.97802          
N = 1,547 Local Health 
Departments 
                  
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department 
aP <.001  
bP <.01  
cP <.05  
Discussion  
The multinomial model reveals that the increase in the number of primary care 
physicians per 10,000 population decreases the probability that the LHD will directly 
perform CVD screening by 1%. This supports our hypothesis. It also supports the possible 
existence of a substitution effect that may have occurred in the communities in the study 
sample.  
Moreover, the presence of a clinician executive director is strongly associated with 
declines in the probability of directly performing CVD screening. This finding could 
possibly be explained by the fact that that the clinician director prefers to stay uninvolved in 
the provision of this service because he or she believes that CVD screening should be done 
by the other providers in the community.  
As the number of staff hired in a LHD increases, so does the increase in the 
probability of a LHD directly performing CVD screening. In addition, this finding also 
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supports previous evidence that an increase in LHD staff has a positive association with 
declines in CVD mortality.93 Wright & Nice13 mentioned that the direction of the relationship 
is difficult to discern, however. They posit that a LHD may choose to offer screening services 
because of a belief that the community needs them and consequently, the LHD then hires 
necessary staff. The other explanation is that LHDs with adequate resources may choose to 
expand their scope of service no matter the community need.  
The presence of a FQHC produces significant results in regards to both choices. The 
results from the multinomial model reveal that having a FQHC in the LHD jurisdiction 
increases the probability of contracting out CVD screening. This increase may be due, in 
part, by shared service arrangements between LHDs and FQHCs.94 LHD and FQHC 
partnerships are encouraged, and recommendations in 2010 were made to highlight effective 
ways to do so.94 The presence of a FQHC also decreases the probability of directly 
performing it, further supporting the choice to contract out instead. Furthermore, CVD is 
among the top three primary diagnoses in FQHCs. 
The results also revealed important findings from the demand side.  In terms of 
sociodemographic characteristics, an increase in the percentage of non-white individuals 
decreases the probability of directly performing the service. A possible explanation could be 
that non-white individuals may prefer to go to another health system, more specifically, a 
FQHC. Recent evidence points out that residents actually prefer the type of care they receive 
in FQHCs.17 Furthermore, more than half of the patients in a FQHC are racial minorities.95 
It is probable that low income racial minorities, who make up the majority of the patient base 
in FQHCs, are the same group we observe is associated with the decreased probability of 
directly performing CVD screening. This further supports why the presence of a FHQC 
increases the probability of contracting out this service since LHDs and FQHCs are 
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encouraged to collaborate.94 On the other hand, however, as the percentage of people in 
poverty increases, so does the probability of directly performing CVD screening. This may 
be because some directors believe that offering clinical preventive services is a part of the 
overall mission of public health, or some LHDs may simply have the resources and 
capabilities to perform CVD screening directly.  
Having a state or local governance decreases the probability of performing this 
service directly, as opposed to staying uninvolved. Since the degree of centralization may 
have consequential influence on spending,84 it may also play a role in why LHDs opt to stay 
uninvolved when they have a state or local governance. State and local agencies may choose 
to stay uninvolved either because of financial and budgetary reasons, or it is because decision 
makers are aware of other providers in the community can provide this service instead.  
Lastly, LHD location in a metro area increases the probability of directly performing 
this service. Moreover, jurisdiction population size served of 99,999 to 499,999 and greater 
than 500,000 increase the probability of directly performing CVD screening as well. These 
findings support evidence on the existence of rural-urban disparities in CVD screening. It 
also supports the supposition that LHDs in larger jurisdictions may choose to directly 
perform CVD screening regardless of the presence of private providers in the community 
because of adequate resources and capacity.13 
These results contribute to a priority area in both public health and medicine.  As 
heart disease is the number one cause of death, finding best practices between both fields 
calls for synergy and collaborations to find the best strategies to improve population health 
and curb costs. Early detection through screening, coupled with drug adherence, can give 
out national hope in eliminating CVD.96   
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Limitations  
There are a few limitations in this study. First, our study has a cross-sectional study 
design.  No cause-effect relationship is implicated. Future studies could have a longitudinal 
study design to strengthen the associations and uncover trends over time. This could be done 
in the near future after the 2016 NACCHO Profile Survey and 2015-2016 AHRF are 
released. Furthermore, external validity is limited to county and multi-county LHDs only. 
City, city-county, and multi-city LHDs were excluded from this study, and therefore the 
results cannot be generalized to all LHDs in the United States. However, the majority of 
LHDs across the United States are on the county level.  
Conclusions 
In conclusion, our hypothesis was correct. Our results support the supposition that a 
LHD’s choice to be involved with CVD screening is dependent on the availability or supply 
of private providers (i.e., primary care physicians). Other significant associations concerning 
LHD staff, population size served, metropolitan location, and the presence of a FQHC are 
noteworthy, especially with the choice to contract out. This study implies that CVD 
screening services entail a complex relationship with other providers as well as FQHCs. 
Moreover, the evidence from this study provides further support that increases in LHD staff 
is associated with the reduction of CVD mortality. It also supports provides further support 
for public health funding. Mays and Smith who revealed over a 13 year time period, for 
every 10% increase in public health spending, CVD mortality rates fell by 3.2%.84 In 
summary, the interplay between public health inputs and population health outcomes further 
illustrate the need to support public health practice policy.  
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
Introduction 
The private healthcare sector includes physicians, physician assistants, nurse 
practitioners, and advanced practice registered nurses (midlevels). Private practices and 
clinics are often thought as the usual sources of care for clinical preventive services. 
However, other health systems in the public sector, such as federally qualified health centers 
(FQHCs) and local health departments (LHDs) also offer these services along with  
In 2012, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a report entitled, Primary Care 
and Public Health: Exploring Integration to Improve Population Health, and reminded us 
all of the need for integration and collaboration among health systems in order to achieve 
optimal population health outcomes. Neither medical care nor public health alone can save 
our nation’s health. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to re-examine the provision of 
health healthcare services among LHDs12 and understand a LHD’s choice to be involved 
with disease screening activities, such as cancer and cardiovascular disease screening.  
 It was posited that the provision of such services is conditional on the supply and 
availability of private healthcare providers in the community who are independent of LHD 
funding, suggesting a substitution effect. Thus, we hypothesized that a LHD’s choice to be 
involved in either cancer or CVD screening, by either directly performing the service or 
contracting it out, is conditional on the availability and capacity of other providers who are 
independent of LHD funding in the community. Using a cross-sectional study design, we 
used maximum likelihood estimation with binomial, multinomial, and sequential logit 
models to test our hypotheses.  
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We first merged the 2013 NACCHO Profile Survey with the 2013 NACCHO 
Boundary Files and the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 Area Health Resource Files (AHRF). 
Results for each service were surprisingly different. A LHD’s choice to be involved with the 
provision of cancer screening is not associated with the availability of other healthcare 
providers in the community. However, the training (degree) of the LHD director (MPH, 
DrPH), key sociodemographic variables, governance characteristics, and jurisdiction 
population size may have some influence in the decision making process since those 
covariates were statistically significant. For CVD screening, results illustrated that the 
LHD’s choice to be involved by directly performing CVD screening is associated with the 
availability of private providers in the community. Other key variables such as the number 
of LHD staff, metro location, governance, and jurisdiction population size were strongly 
associated with a LHD’s decision.  
Cancer screening: Implications for public health practice and policy 
The results of our studies revealed both surprising and consistent results from 
previous studies. TAlthough the results suggest that the availability and supply of private 
healthcare providers who are independent of LHD funding are not associated with a LHD’s 
decision to be involved with cancer screening, we learned valuable information regardless. 
Perhaps it is not a substitution effect we should be investigating, but a synergistic one. 
Moreover, one of the key characteristics that should have special attention is the training or 
degree of the LHD director. The decision to be involved with cancer screening is associated 
with whether or not the LHD director has a public health degree (MPH or DrPH). Another 
key variable is the association with the number of LHD staff. As the number of LHD staff 
increases, so does the probability that a LHD will directly perform cancer screening. From a 
practice standpoint, these findings help to validate the vast contribution of public health staff 
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and management in the improvement of population health outcomes.  
Because of the nature of the survey, NACCHO asked the survey respondent if the 
LHD was involved with cancer screening, but the question did not stratify cancer screening 
into the differing types. However, LHDs are mainly involved with cervical, breast, and 
colorectal cancer screenings. There is meaningful evidence on the effectiveness of these 
screening activities, as supported by recommendations from the United States Preventive 
Services Taskforce (USPSTF). However, despite these recommendations, minimal progress 
in increasing cancer screening rates in the past decades have occurred. Racial and ethnic 
minorities, low-income, and uninsured individuals have disproportionately higher rates of 
cancer diagnoses who often present in later, more advanced stages.97 In attempts to reduce 
disparities in breast and cervical cancer, Congress passed the Breast and Cervical Cancer 
Mortality Prevention Act in 1990. Ten years later, the National Breast and Cervical Cancer 
Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP) was implemented. Our findings illustrate several 
important observations from the demand side (i.e., the uninsured or non-white populations) 
and further justify the need for on-going legislation and continued federal funding support 
for this program.  
Part of the funding from the NBCCDEP supports both clinical and non-clinical 
cancer screening components. The IOM stated in the report, Primary care and public health: 
exploring integration to improve population health, “In particular, the NBCCEDP could 
leverage its non-screening components to help integrate public health and primary care, 
reducing an existing community clinical services gap and facilitating health care access for 
a broader population than traditionally reached.98 This recommendation can open up doors 
for increasing LHD staff without a clinical background. Non-clinical staff could be properly 
trained through workshops, certifications, and seminars to effectively provide health 
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education on the life-saving capabilities of screening as well as follow-up if precancerous 
lesions or masses are found.  
From a health policy perspective, it may be feasible and cost-effective if the scope of 
practice for culturally competent non-clinical staff could be widened.  An example could be 
a non-clinical LHD staff could educate the patient while he or she is waiting for the clinician 
in the exam room. This would reinforce the importance of screening and could perhaps 
increase follow-up and/or treatment adherence rates. It is important to note that reminder 
registries are not enough for adherence; understanding the cultural and institutional barriers 
and contexts are necessary for follow-up or routine screening.99  
Furthermore, the non-clinical staff could educate the patient if he or she is suspected 
to need further examinations and biopsies. Less advanced clinical skills are more paramount 
than ever as numerous who were previously uninsured now have access to care. Policies that 
support widening the scope of practice for practitioners with less skills than midlevels (i.e., 
licensed practical nurses, LHD staff with a public health bachelor or master’s degree trained 
in health behavior or health promotion) should be considered in light of the non-clinical 
health education components of cancer screening. From a practice standpoint, this provides 
evidence that increased funding should be allocated towards the training of the future public 
health workforce. Policymakers should be informed of the importance of providing funding 
and scholarships for those who wish to pursue a career in public health. Further, as many 
health professional shortage areas (HPSAs) and medically underserved areas (MUAs) 
struggle with physician shortages, the need for innovative ways to deliver timely and 
effective clinical care to rural or low-resource communities is a priority. Timeliness of 
screening is a significant factor in survival, as many invasive cancers can be caught early, 
lessening the risk of more advanced treatments, costs, and deaths.  
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Cardiovascular disease screening: Implications for public health practice and 
policy 
Heart disease is the number one cause of mortality in the United States. Many 
individuals do not know that they may have early onset CVD, but screening can help identify 
early risk factors, so patients can work towards eating a healthy, low sodium diet, for 
example, increase physical activity levels, or take prescribed treatments, such as cholesterol 
lowering statins.  
The multinomial model revealed that the increase in the number of primary care 
physicians per 10,000 population did indeed decrease the probability that the LHD will 
directly perform CVD screening by 1%. As the population increases, so does the significance 
and magnitude of this effect. This has consequences for both medical care and public health, 
as it supports the existence of a substitution effect. Primary care physicians and midlevels 
should consider opening up communication with public health practitioners and create a 
shared dialogue on the best ways to provide CVD screening in the specific community.   
The results also illustrated that an increase in the percentage of non-white racial 
minorities decreases the probability of directly performing CVD screening. Racial and ethnic 
minorities could simply be going to another health system, such as a FQHC for CVD 
screening. However, as the percentage of people in poverty increases, so does the probability 
of directly performing CVD screening. This finding may be attributed to the fact that some 
LHD directors may believe that offering clinical preventive services is a part of the overall 
mission of public health. Or, perhaps, some LHDs may have adequate resources to directly 
perform CVD screening. Our findings support on-going legislation and funding for for 
chronic disease screening low-income, uninsured, or racial and ethnic minorities who 
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experience a disproportionate burden from CVD.  
A multitude of ED visits are from strokes or cardiac events and chest pain is listed as 
a top reason.100 The trends revealed that in general, the larger the LHD, the better resourced 
it is, and the LHD has the capacity to perform CVD screening directly. However, some LHDs 
display tendencies to rely on others who are independent of public health funding (e.g., 
FQHCs) to provide the service. Findings associated with declines in CVD mortality rates, 
supported through increases in public health spending84 and LHD staff employed93 further 
justify the need for some LHDs to directly perform CVD screening.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, cancer and cardiovascular disease screenings give many people a 
chance to live healthier, better lives. Because of our findings, improving individualized 
patient care can lead to real impacts on population health. Health systems should work 
toward a common goal to reduce cancer and CVD morbidities and mortalities. Emphasis 
should be on the lifespan, with primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, for health and 
wellness are dynamic. With evidence from novel findings that increases in public health 
spending leads to dramatic decreases in both cancer and CVD mortality,84 Congress and state 
legislatures should realize the overall and long-term impact of prevention and the need for 
on-going research to inform best practices and health policies.  
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APPENDIX I  
SPECIFICATION TESTS 
 
Finding the preferred model (binomial logit models)  
 
Parsimonious model without interaction terms 
logit p = β0 + fqhcpresβ1 + per100_totalhospbedsβ2 + per10_primcarephysβ3 + per10_midlevelsβ4  
+ p_percentpplnonwhite2013β5 + p_percentpplhisp2013β6 + p_percentpplinpov2013β7  
+ p_percentpplunins2013β8 + lhdemployper10β9 + clindirpresβ10  + phdirpresβ11 
+ lbohβ12 + c0govcatβ13 + rucametro β14 + rucaurbanβ15  + jurspopsizecat16 + ε 
 
With interaction terms 
logit p = β0 + fqhcpresβ1 + per100_totalhospbedsβ2 + per10_primcarephysβ3 + per10_midlevelsβ4 
+ p_percentpplnonwhite2013β5 + p_percentpplhisp2013β6 + p_percentpplinpov2013β7 
+ p_percentpplunins2013β8 + lhdemployper10β9 + clindirpresβ10  + phdirpresβ11 
+ lbohβ12 + c0govcatβ13 + rucametro β14 + rucaurbanβ15 + rucametro*per10_primcarephysβ16 
+ rucametro*per10_midlevelsβ17 + rucaurban* per10_primcarephys18 
+ rucaurban* per10_midlevelsβ19 + jurspopsizecat20 + ε 
 
The “logit p” is the log of the probability of choosing the discrete choice dependent variable (0,1).    
 
Hausman Test Results 
 
*HAUSMAN TEST OUTPUT FOR CANCER SCREENING MNL MODEL 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (0) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested (50); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be 
problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators 
        for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that 
the coefficients are on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |    partial        all         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
contract     | 
2.jurisdic~e |   -1.476891    -1.476891               0               0 
  1.fqhcpres |     .728354      .728354               0               0 
p_perc~e2013 |    .0093413     .0093413               0               0 
p_perc~p2013 |    -.004984     -.004984               0               0 
p_perc~v2013 |    .0448418     .0448418               0               0 
p_perc~s2013 |   -.1011442    -.1011442               0               0 
lhdemploy~10 |    .0242913     .0242913               0               0 
1.clindirp~s |   -.0540225    -.0540225               0               0 
 1.phdirpres |   -.2418583    -.2418583               0               0 
  1.lbohpres |    .5923794     .5923794               0               0 
1bn.c0govcat |   -2.995445    -2.995445               0               0 
  2.c0govcat |   -2.536145    -2.536145               0               0 
 1.rucametro |    .5246477     .5246477               0               0 
 1.rucaurban |   -.2102856    -.2102856               0               0 
1bn.jurspo~t |    .6111563     .6111563               0               0 
2.jurspops~t |    .8403058     .8403058               0               0 
3.jurspops~t |    .9018718     .9018718               0               0 
4.jurspops~t |    1.215918     1.215918               0               0 
per10_prim~s |    .0132599     .0132599               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0702391    -.0702391               0               0 
per10_midl~s |     .016384      .016384               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |    .0086368     .0086368               0               0 
per100_tot~s |    .0001756     .0001756               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0006454    -.0006454               0               0 
       _cons |   -1.583586    -1.583586               0               0 
82  
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
direct       | 
2.jurisdic~e |    .2463095     .2463095               0               0 
  1.fqhcpres |    .0279319     .0279319               0               0 
p_perc~e2013 |   -.0065667    -.0065667               0               0 
p_perc~p2013 |   -.0123565    -.0123565               0               0 
p_perc~v2013 |    .0613967     .0613967               0               0 
p_perc~s2013 |    .0415392     .0415392               0               0 
lhdemploy~10 |    .0185718     .0185718               0               0 
1.clindirp~s |   -.2508029    -.2508029               0               0 
 1.phdirpres |    .2878713     .2878713               0               0 
  1.lbohpres |    .1560032     .1560032               0               0 
1bn.c0govcat |   -1.425153    -1.425153               0               0 
  2.c0govcat |   -2.043053    -2.043053               0               0 
 1.rucametro |    .3131264     .3131264               0               0 
 1.rucaurban |    .1129166     .1129166               0               0 
1bn.jurspo~t |    .2572065     .2572065               0               0 
2.jurspops~t |    .7149778     .7149778               0               0 
3.jurspops~t |    .5567551     .5567551               0               0 
4.jurspops~t |    .5864557     .5864557               0               0 
per10_prim~s |    .0284793     .0284793               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0579207    -.0579207               0               0 
per10_midl~s |   -.0257822    -.0257822               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |    .0454651     .0454651               0               0 
per100_tot~s |   -.0002109    -.0002109               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0000809    -.0000809               0               0 
       _cons |   -.8244536    -.8244536               0               0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit 
           B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(0) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.00 
                Prob>chi2 =           . 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
 
*HAUSMAN TEST OUTPUT FOR CVD SCREENING MNL MODEL 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (0) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested (50); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be 
problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators 
        for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that 
the coefficients are on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |    partial        all         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
contract     | 
2.jurisdic~e |   -14.67496    -14.67496               0               0 
  1.fqhcpres |    1.221286     1.221286               0               0 
p_perc~e2013 |   -.0334765    -.0334765               0               0 
p_perc~p2013 |   -.0056945    -.0056945               0               0 
p_perc~v2013 |    .0592469     .0592469               0               0 
p_perc~s2013 |   -.0269614    -.0269614               0               0 
lhdemploy~10 |    .0251023     .0251023               0               0 
1.clindirp~s |   -.1226309    -.1226309               0               0 
 1.phdirpres |    .0024495     .0024495               0               0 
  1.lbohpres |    .6867842     .6867842               0               0 
1bn.c0govcat |   -1.770894    -1.770894               0               0 
  2.c0govcat |   -.8678868    -.8678868               0               0 
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 1.rucametro |    -.729047     -.729047               0               0 
 1.rucaurban |    .1098945     .1098945               0               0 
1bn.jurspo~t |    .4614484     .4614484               0               0 
2.jurspops~t |   -14.17041    -14.17041               0               0 
3.jurspops~t |    .6986486     .6986486               0               0 
4.jurspops~t |    .4149051     .4149051               0               0 
per10_prim~s |   -.0804522    -.0804522               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |    .2635594     .2635594               0               0 
per10_midl~s |    .0591647     .0591647               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0845169    -.0845169               0               0 
per100_tot~s |    -.002214     -.002214               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |    .0020632     .0020632               0               0 
       _cons |   -5.335471    -5.335471               0               0 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
direct       | 
2.jurisdic~e |    .0476698     .0476698               0               0 
  1.fqhcpres |   -.5051533    -.5051533               0               0 
p_perc~e2013 |   -.0182128    -.0182128               0               0 
p_perc~p2013 |   -.0050141    -.0050141               0               0 
p_perc~v2013 |    .0652426     .0652426               0               0 
p_perc~s2013 |    .0204492     .0204492               0               0 
lhdemploy~10 |    .0238498     .0238498               0               0 
1.clindirp~s |   -.6474553    -.6474553               0               0 
 1.phdirpres |    .1870254     .1870254               0               0 
  1.lbohpres |     .223064      .223064               0               0 
1bn.c0govcat |   -1.324782    -1.324782               0               0 
  2.c0govcat |   -1.240968    -1.240968               0               0 
 1.rucametro |     .432342      .432342               0               0 
 1.rucaurban |    .1714027     .1714027               0               0 
1bn.jurspo~t |    .2963241     .2963241               0               0 
2.jurspops~t |      .67062       .67062               0               0 
3.jurspops~t |    .7591342     .7591342               0               0 
4.jurspops~t |    1.695354     1.695354               0               0 
per10_prim~s |   -.0511455    -.0511455               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0132051    -.0132051               0               0 
per10_midl~s |    .0022773     .0022773               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |    .0268177     .0268177               0               0 
per100_tot~s |     .000162      .000162               0               0 
1.rucametr~s |   -.0008557    -.0008557               0               0 
       _cons |   -1.437397    -1.437397               0               0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit 
           B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(0) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.00 
                Prob>chi2 =           . 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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APPENDIX II 
SEQUENTIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION (CANCER) 
 
*Sequential Logit Model output for CANCER SCREENING 
 
*Transition 1: A LHD chooses between becoming involved (1) or not involved (0) 
 
*The binary dependent variable is "any_caninv - not involved = 0; involved =1" 
 
*Calculating Average ME for the BIN model.  
margins, dydx(*) noatlegend 
 
*Same output that from the original BIN logit regression model.  
 
. margins, dydx(*) noatlegend 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       1565 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(any_caninv), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.fqhcpres per100_totalhospbeds per10_primcarephys per10_midlevels 
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 p_percentpplhisp2013 p_percentpplinpov2013 
p_percentpplunins2013 lhdemployper10 1.clindirpres 1.phdirpres 1.lbohpres 
               1.c0govcat 2.c0govcat 1.rucametro 1.rucaurban 1.jurspopsizecat 
2.jurspopsizecat 3.jurspopsizecat 4.jurspopsizecat 2.jurisdiction_type 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ 
                         |            Delta-method 
                         |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------
------ 
              1.fqhcpres |   .0155489   .0288854     0.54   0.590    -.0410654    
.0721632 
    per100_totalhospbeds |  -.0000356   .0000345    -1.03   0.301    -.0001033     
.000032 
      per10_primcarephys |   .0018332   .0050381     0.36   0.716    -.0080413    
.0117077 
         per10_midlevels |  -.0004886   .0020061    -0.24   0.808    -.0044204    
.0034432 
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 |  -.0011078   .0010574    -1.05   0.295    -.0031804    
.0009647 
    p_percentpplhisp2013 |  -.0026404    .001462    -1.81   0.071    -.0055059     
.000225 
   p_percentpplinpov2013 |   .0126472   .0029928     4.23   0.000     .0067814    
.0185131 
   p_percentpplunins2013 |    .006767   .0035636     1.90   0.058    -.0002174    
.0137514 
          lhdemployper10 |   .0039437   .0013901     2.84   0.005     .0012191    
.0066683 
           1.clindirpres |  -.0424295   .0388555    -1.09   0.275    -.1185848    
.0337258 
             1.phdirpres |   .0545541   .0310692     1.76   0.079    -.0063404    
.1154486 
              1.lbohpres |   .0393928   .0281698     1.40   0.162    -.0158191    
.0946046 
                         | 
                c0govcat | 
                      1  |   -.305994   .0431654    -7.09   0.000    -.3905967   -
.2213913 
                      2  |  -.4355785   .0376935   -11.56   0.000    -.5094564   -
.3617007 
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                         | 
             1.rucametro |   .1016435   .0453418     2.24   0.025     .0127751    
.1905119 
             1.rucaurban |   .0269714   .0399351     0.68   0.499       -.0513    
.1052429 
                         | 
          jurspopsizecat | 
                      1  |   .0530814   .0355812     1.49   0.136    -.0166565    
.1228193 
                      2  |   .1443993    .040708     3.55   0.000      .064613    
.2241855 
                      3  |   .1174309   .0478561     2.45   0.014     .0236347     
.211227 
                      4  |   .1282085   .0695054     1.84   0.065    -.0080196    
.2644366 
                         | 
     2.jurisdiction_type |   .0292782   .0495634     0.59   0.555    -.0678642    
.1264206 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
scalar ll_a = e(ll) 
  
predict fit_a, xb 
 
*Transition 2: Among LHD who are involved with cancer screening activity (performing 
directly or contracting out as opposed to no inv) 
 
gen performdir=0 if canservice_type==3  
replace performdir=1 if canservice_type==2 
label variable performdir "perform directly = 0; contract out = 1" 
label define dir 0 "perform directly" 1 "contract out" 
label values performdir dir  
 
fre performdir 
 
. fre performdir 
 
performdir -- perform directly = 0; contract out = 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
Valid   0 perform directly |        660      40.12      92.05      92.05 
        1 contract out     |         57       3.47       7.95     100.00 
        Total              |        717      43.59     100.00            
Missing .                  |        928      56.41                       
Total                      |       1645     100.00                       
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. logit performdir $xlist  
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -192.84987   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -173.39768   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -168.28581   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -168.20325   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -168.20299   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -168.20299   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        702 
                                                  LR chi2(21)     =      49.29 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0005 
Log likelihood = -168.20299                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1278 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
              performdir |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------- 
              1.fqhcpres |   .5724763    .395424     1.45   0.148    -.2025405    
1.347493 
    per100_totalhospbeds |    .000127   .0002641     0.48   0.631    -.0003906    
.0006447 
      per10_primcarephys |  -.0256841   .0604858    -0.42   0.671     -.144234    
.0928658 
         per10_midlevels |   .0167188   .0226597     0.74   0.461    -.0276933     
.061131 
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 |   .0104272   .0126857     0.82   0.411    -.0144364    
.0352907 
    p_percentpplhisp2013 |    .007368   .0226076     0.33   0.744     -.036942     
.051678 
   p_percentpplinpov2013 |  -.0202111   .0377537    -0.54   0.592     -.094207    
.0537849 
   p_percentpplunins2013 |   -.145398    .049878    -2.92   0.004     -.243157   -
.0476389 
          lhdemployper10 |   .0048732   .0167735     0.29   0.771    -.0280023    
.0377487 
           1.clindirpres |   .2049044   .4781375     0.43   0.668    -.7322279    
1.142037 
             1.phdirpres |  -.5164796   .4015322    -1.29   0.198    -1.303468     
.270509 
              1.lbohpres |   .3795235   .3963619     0.96   0.338    -.3973316    
1.156379 
                         | 
                c0govcat | 
                      1  |  -1.540796   .6325449    -2.44   0.015    -2.780561   -
.3010305 
                      2  |  -.4432076   .3910854    -1.13   0.257    -1.209721    
.3233057 
                         | 
             1.rucametro |  -.5096301   .7154592    -0.71   0.476    -1.911904    
.8926442 
             1.rucaurban |    -.52096   .6460644    -0.81   0.420    -1.787223    
.7453029 
                         | 
          jurspopsizecat | 
                      1  |   .4104269   .5369548     0.76   0.445    -.6419852    
1.462839 
                      2  |   .2007516   .6033711     0.33   0.739    -.9818339    
1.383337 
                      3  |   .1825535    .668434     0.27   0.785    -1.127553     
1.49266 
                      4  |   .3257088   .8504311     0.38   0.702    -1.341105    
1.992523 
                         | 
     2.jurisdiction_type |  -1.738378   .9238636    -1.88   0.060    -3.549118    
.0723614 
                   _cons |   .1119881   1.160473     0.10   0.923    -2.162497    
2.386473 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
margins, dydx(*) noatlegend 
 
scalar ll_p = e(ll) 
  
predict fit_p, xb 
 
di ll_a + ll_p 
-1118.4908 
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. mlogit canservice_type $xlist  
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1269.3291   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1128.7312   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1117.3369   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1117.2113   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1117.2108   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1117.2108   
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =       1565 
                                                  LR chi2(42)     =     304.24 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1117.2108                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1198 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ 
         canservice_type |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------- 
not_involved             |  (base outcome) 
-------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------- 
contract                 | 
              1.fqhcpres |   .7140555   .3809069     1.87   0.061    -.0325083    
1.460619 
    per100_totalhospbeds |   .0001719   .0002884     0.60   0.551    -.0003934    
.0007372 
      per10_primcarephys |  -.0239275   .0586738    -0.41   0.683     -.138926    
.0910711 
         per10_midlevels |   .0103318   .0208026     0.50   0.619    -.0304406    
.0511041 
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 |   .0082686   .0125902     0.66   0.511    -.0164076    
.0329449 
    p_percentpplhisp2013 |  -.0045519   .0213185    -0.21   0.831    -.0463353    
.0372316 
   p_percentpplinpov2013 |   .0414519   .0364809     1.14   0.256    -.0300493    
.1129532 
   p_percentpplunins2013 |  -.0994021   .0486301    -2.04   0.041    -.1947155   -
.0040888 
          lhdemployper10 |    .023836    .011786     2.02   0.043     .0007359     
.046936 
           1.clindirpres |  -.0622742   .4449387    -0.14   0.889     -.934338    
.8097897 
             1.phdirpres |  -.2503539   .3900697    -0.64   0.521    -1.014876    
.5141686 
              1.lbohpres |   .6064821   .4013302     1.51   0.131    -.1801106    
1.393075 
                         | 
                c0govcat | 
                      1  |  -2.991305   .6444818    -4.64   0.000    -4.254466   -
1.728144 
                      2  |   -2.54805   .4231037    -6.02   0.000    -3.377318   -
1.718782 
                         | 
             1.rucametro |    .075051   .6799798     0.11   0.912    -1.257685    
1.407787 
             1.rucaurban |  -.1388776   .6174125    -0.22   0.822    -1.348984    
1.071229 
                         | 
          jurspopsizecat | 
                      1  |   .6258986   .5175632     1.21   0.227    -.3885067    
1.640304 
                      2  |    .847844   .5757191     1.47   0.141    -.2805447    
1.976233 
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                      3  |    .892279    .649584     1.37   0.170    -.3808823     
2.16544 
                      4  |   1.184628   .8320434     1.42   0.155    -.4461467    
2.815404 
                         | 
     2.jurisdiction_type |    -1.3668    .903345    -1.51   0.130    -3.137324    
.4037239 
                   _cons |  -1.300662   1.079715    -1.20   0.228    -3.416864    
.8155403 
-------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------
------ 
direct                   | 
              1.fqhcpres |   .0181835    .139757     0.13   0.896    -.2557352    
.2921022 
    per100_totalhospbeds |  -.0002235   .0001762    -1.27   0.205    -.0005688    
.0001218 
      per10_primcarephys |   .0104772   .0247127     0.42   0.672    -.0379589    
.0589132 
         per10_midlevels |  -.0033588   .0099048    -0.34   0.735     -.022772    
.0160543 
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 |  -.0065511   .0051255    -1.28   0.201    -.0165969    
.0034948 
    p_percentpplhisp2013 |  -.0132462   .0071064    -1.86   0.062    -.0271746    
.0006822 
   p_percentpplinpov2013 |   .0630056   .0147722     4.27   0.000     .0340526    
.0919586 
   p_percentpplunins2013 |   .0428789   .0173478     2.47   0.013     .0088779    
.0768799 
          lhdemployper10 |   .0179347   .0067364     2.66   0.008     .0047316    
.0311379 
           1.clindirpres |  -.2241178    .194993    -1.15   0.250     -.606297    
.1580614 
             1.phdirpres |   .2938095   .1473652     1.99   0.046     .0049789    
.5826401 
              1.lbohpres |   .1528561   .1392918     1.10   0.272    -.1201509     
.425863 
                         | 
                c0govcat | 
                      1  |  -1.427199   .2543352    -5.61   0.000    -1.925687   -
.9287112 
                      2  |  -2.028854   .2406887    -8.43   0.000    -2.500595   -
1.557113 
                         | 
             1.rucametro |   .5101167   .2195575     2.32   0.020     .0797919    
.9404415 
             1.rucaurban |   .1437761   .1938956     0.74   0.458    -.2362524    
.5238045 
                         | 
          jurspopsizecat | 
                      1  |   .2351991   .1759924     1.34   0.181    -.1097398    
.5801379 
                      2  |   .6769865   .1980592     3.42   0.001     .2887977    
1.065175 
                      3  |   .5302248    .233122     2.27   0.023     .0733142    
.9871355 
                      4  |   .5427795   .3359615     1.62   0.106     -.115693    
1.201252 
                         | 
     2.jurisdiction_type |   .2393523    .236364     1.01   0.311    -.2239127    
.7026172 
                   _cons |  -1.017094   .4529154    -2.25   0.025    -1.904791   -
.1293957 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
scalar ll_mnl = e(ll) 
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predict fit_mnl, xb 
 
scalar dev = 2*(ll_mnl - ll_a - ll_p) 
  
di dev, chi2tail(22,dev) 
2.5600057 .99999988  
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2008 – 2009     Research Fellow, National Science Foundation (NSF), Appalachian and   Minority 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Majors (AMSTEMM), 
University of Kentucky 
2007 – 2009     Research Assistant, Department of Chemistry, Sanders Brown Center on Aging, 
University    of Kentucky 
III. TEACHING EXPERIENCES 
   2015 Teaching Assistant, “Health Services and Systems Organizations,” Masters, Fall 
Semester, College of Public Health, University of Kentucky 
 
   2015 Instructor, “Health and Medical Care Delivery Systems,” Undergraduate, Spring 
Semester, College of Public Health, University of Kentucky 
 
   2014 Teaching Assistant, “Management of Public Health Organizations,” Masters, Fall 
Semester, College of Public Health, University of Kentucky 
 
   2014 Teaching Assistant, “Well Managed Public Health Organizations,” Doctoral, Fall 
Semester, College of Public Health, University of Kentucky 
 
IV. INVITED LECTURES 
 
2014 Invited lecturer, undergraduate general studies course, tutorial on reference 
management software and how to find peer reviewed journal articles, University of 
Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, November 3-4, 2014.  
 
2013  Invited lecturer, incoming Master of Public Health students at the University of 
Cincinnati, College of Medicine, Department of Environmental Health, Cincinnati, 
OH, September 27, 2013. 
 
2011  Radio talk show guest, "Health Matters," Morehead State University Radio Talk 
Show, Morehead, Kentucky, November 12, 2011  
 
V. PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS 
1. Di Domenico, F, Sultana, R, Tiu, GF, Scheff, NN, Perluigi, M, Cini, C, Butterfield, DA. 
(2010). Protein Levels of Heat Shock Proteins 27, 32, 60, 70, 90 and Thioredoxin-1 in 
Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment: An Investigation on the Role of Cellular Stress 
Response in the Progression of Alzheimer’s Disease. Brain Research, 1333, 72-81. 
doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2010.03.085. [PMID: 20362559] 
 
2. Tiu, GF, Sultana, R, Butterfield, DA. (2009). The Levels of Signaling Proteins in Brain of 
Control Subjects versus Brain from Subjects with Mild Cognitive Impairment: Insights into 
Alzheimer’s Disease. Kaleidoscope: University of Kentucky Journal of Undergraduate 
Scholarship, 8, 62-69. 
 
3. Tiu, GF, Sultana, R, Butterfield, DA. (2009). Investigating Heat Shock Protein Expression 
Levels with the Interaction of Ceria Nanoparticles in the Cerebral Cortex: Insights into 
Alzheimer’s Disease. Kaleidoscope: University of Kentucky Journal of Undergraduate 
Scholarship, 8, 124-126. 
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VI. SCIENTIFIC PRESENTATIONS  
Schuster, AM, Niro, N, Schuier, M, Tiu, GF, Abofaye, M. Preparing for disaster: Lexington, 
Kentucky’s emergency plans for older adults. Poster presentation at the 36th Annual Meeting 
Southern Gerontological Society, April 15-18, 2015, Williamsburg, Virginia.  
 
Tiu, GF, Scutchfield, FD. Rural Physicians and their Spouses in the Appalachian Regional 
Healthcare (ARH) System: Factors that Influence Retention. Oral presentation at the Appalachian 
Regional Healthcare (ARH) Medical Leadership Staff Council, January 17, 2015, Lexington, 
Kentucky. 
 
Tiu, GF, Mays, GP. Regional Variation in Economic Values of Unpaid Care for Individuals with 
Alzheimer’s disease and other Dementias and Medicare Nursing Home Expenditures for Long-term 
Care. Poster presentation at the American Society for Health Economists (ASHEcon) Fifth Biennial 
Conference, June 22-25, 2014, Los Angeles, CA, University of Southern California. 
 
Tiu, GF, Mays, GP. Regional Variation in Economic Values of Unpaid Care for Individuals with 
Alzheimer’s disease and other Dementias and Medicare Nursing Home Expenditures for Long-term 
Care. Poster presentation at the American Public Health Association (APHA) 141st Annual 
Meeting, November 2-6, 2013, Boston, MA. 
 
Tiu, GF, Ying, J, Scutchfield, FD, Lamberth, CD. Rural Physicians and their Spouses: Factors that 
Influence Retention in Central Appalachia. Poster presentation at the American Public Health 
Association (APHA) 141st Annual Meeting, November 2-6, 2013, Boston, MA. 
 
Tiu, GF, Mays, GP. Informal Unpaid Caregiving for Alzheimer’s disease and Other Dementias and 
Its Relationship with Long-Term Care Medicare Nursing Home Expenditures. Poster presentation 
at the AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting, Long-term Care Interest Group, June 22, 2013, 
Baltimore, MD.  
 
Tiu, GF, Ying, J, Scutchfield, FD, Lamberth, CD. Rural Physicians and their Spouses: Factors that 
Influence Retention in Central Appalachia. Poster presentation at the College of Public Health 
Research Day in conjunction with the Center for Clinical and Translational Sciences, April 15, 2013, 
Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
Tiu, GF, Ying, J, Scutchfield, FD. Rural Physicians in Central Appalachia: Factors that Influence 
Recruitment and Retention. Oral presentation at the Appalachian Regional Healthcare (ARH) 
Medical Leadership Staff Council, May 20, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
Tiu, GF, Ying, J, Scutchfield, FD. Rural Physicians in Central Appalachia: Factors that Influence 
Recruitment and Retention. Oral presentation at the Appalachian Regional Healthcare (ARH) 
Medical Leadership Staff Council, May 20, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
Tiu, GF, Sultana, R, Butterfield, DA. The Levels of Signaling Proteins in Brain of Control Subjects 
Versus Brain from Subjects with Mild Cognitive Impairment: Insights into Alzheimer’s Disease. 
Poster presentation at the Kentucky Academy of Science (KAS) Conference, November 1, 2009, 
Lexington, Kentucky.  
 
Tiu, GF, Sultana, R, Butterfield, DA. The Levels of Signaling Proteins in Brain of Control Subjects 
Versus Brain from Subjects with Mild Cognitive Impairment: Insights into Alzheimer’s Disease. Oral 
presentation at the Appalachian and Minority Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
Majors (AMSTEMM) Research Colloquium, November 1, 2009, Lexington, Kentucky.  
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Tiu, GF, Sultana, R, Butterfield, DA. The Levels of Signaling Proteins in Brain of Control Subjects 
Versus Brain from Subjects with Mild Cognitive Impairment: Insights into Alzheimer’s Disease. 
Poster presentation at the National Conferences on Undergraduate Research (NCUR), April 16 -
18, 2009, University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse, La-Crosse, Wisconsin. 
 
Tiu, GF, Sultana, R, Butterfield, DA. The Levels of Signaling Proteins in Brain of Control Subjects 
Versus Brain from Subjects with Mild Cognitive Impairment: Insights into Alzheimer’s Disease. 
Poster presentation at the Showcase of Undergraduate Scholars, April 29, 2009, Lexington, 
Kentucky. 
  
  VII. HONORS, AWARDS & CERTIFICATIONS 
 
  2015 Nominee, Golden Apple Teaching Award, College of Public Health, University of 
Kentucky 
 
  2013 – 2014     Elected Student Research Chair, College of Public Health, University of Kentucky 
 
  2012 – 2013 Donovan Scholar in Gerontology, College of Public Health, University of Kentucky 
 
  2013     Nominated Member, Phi Kappa Phi Honorary Society, University of Kentucky 
 
  2012     Preconception Peer Educator, College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati   
 
  2009 Second Place Winner, Oswald Research & Creativity Program, University of 
Kentucky 
 
  2005    Recipient, Commonwealth Scholarship, University of Kentucky 
 
VIII. PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
2014 – present      Public Health Foundation (PHF) 
  
2013 – present      American Society of Health Economists (ASHEcon) 
 
2013 – present      Phi Kappa Phi Honorary Society 
 
2013 – present      National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI), Associate Member 
 
2013 – present      AcademyHealth  
 
2012 – present      American Public Health Association (APHA) 
 
2013 – 2014          Gerontological Society of America (GSA) 
 
2007 – 2009          National Society of Collegiate Scholars (NSCS)  
 
2007 – 2009          Society for the Promotion of Undergraduate Research (SPUR)  
 
 
IX. COMPUTER SKILLS 
 
Stata, SAS, SPSS, Microsoft Excel, Adobe Photoshop CS  
 
94  
X. VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCES 
 
Volunteer for Medical Mission, Surgery Department & Primary Care Clinics, University of the 
Philippines Medical Alumni Society of America, Cebu, Philippines, February 7-10, 2012 
 
Volunteer, Clover Fork Clinic, Primary Care, Harlan, Kentucky, February 2010 
 
Volunteer, St. Joseph Hospital, Pharmacy Department, Lexington, Kentucky, January 2007- 
January 2009 
 
Volunteer, St. Joseph Hospital, Surgery Department, Lexington, Kentucky, January 2007- January 
2009 
 
Volunteer, Daniel Boone Clinic & Emergency Department, Harlan Appalachian Regional Hospital, 
Primary Care, Harlan, Kentucky, August 2004 - May 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Student’s Signature)
(Date)    06/06/2016   
